Adaptive security by Lamprecht, Christiaan Johan
Adaptive Security
Thesis by
Christiaan Johan Lamprecht
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
School of Computing Science
Newcastle University
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
April 2012
Abstract
Automated runtime security adaptation has great potential in providing timely and
fine grained security control. In this thesis we study the practical utility of a run-
time security-performance trade off for the pervasive Secure Socket Layer (SSL/TLS)
protocol. To that end we address a number of research challenges.
We develop an Adaptive Security methodology to extend non-adaptive legacy se-
curity systems with adaptive features. We also create a design of such an extended
system to support the methodology. The design aids in identifying additional key
components necessary for the creation of an adaptive security system.
We furthermore apply our methodology to the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol
to create a design and implementation of a practical Adaptive SSL (ASSL) solution
that supports runtime security adaptation in response to cross-cutting environmental
concerns. The solution effectively adapts security at runtime, only reducing maximum
server load by 15% or more depending on adaptation decision complexity.
Next we address the security-performance trade off research challenge. Following
our methodology we conduct an offline study of factors affecting server performance
when security is adapted. These insights allow for the creation of policies that can
trade off security and performance by taking into account the expected future state of
the system under adaptation. In so doing we found that client SSL session duration,
requested file size and current security algorithm play roles predicting future system
state. Notably, performance deviation is smaller when sessions are longer and files
are smaller and vice versa. A complete Adaptive Security solution which successfully
demonstrates our methodology is implemented with trade-off policies and ASSL as
key components. We show that the solution effectively utilises available processing
resources to increase security whilst still respecting performance guarantees.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the early days of Computing Science the idea of “separation of concerns” has
had a significant impact on how academia and industry approach the design and
implementation of software systems, models and architectures. The phrase was coined
by Edsger W. Dijkstra in his 1982 paper “On the role of scientific thought”:
We know that a program must be correct and we can study it from that
viewpoint only; we also know that it should be efficient and we can study
its efficiency on another day, so to speak. In another mood we may ask
ourselves whether, and if so: why, the program is desirable. But nothing is
gained -on the contrary!- by tackling these various aspects simultaneously.
It is what I sometimes have called “the separation of concerns”, which, even
if not perfectly possible, is yet the only available technique for effective
ordering of one’s thoughts, that I know of. [4]
Some notable examples of this idea in practice includes the Open Systems Inter-
connection (OSI) Basic Reference Model [5]. It provides a set of layered abstractions
for computer network protocol design which allows for separation of concerns between
the layers and so improves operability between protocols. More recently the influen-
tial contributors to the World Wide Web protocol standards have also conceded to
this idea and created two languages, namely eXtensible HyperText Markup Language
(XHTML) and Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), to separate style from content when
designing web pages. Separation of concerns is also made explicit through accepted
programming paradigms such as procedural programming and object-oriented pro-
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gramming. Aspect Oriented programming pushes this idea even further by allowing
cross-cutting concerns, which could include security, logging, tracing, profiling, pool-
ing and cacheing among others, to be dynamically added to objects at runtime (or
compile time) without the objects needing to have any knowledge of the particular
type of addition. The implications and usefulness of this paradigm is an active topic
for current research [6].
That said, the boundaries between concerns is often a grey area. As such it is
an interesting area for research, to either push or break these boundaries in aid of
increasing understanding and grounding their definition. This is no more so evident
than in areas where systems are designed to be intelligent and react to their sur-
roundings. Intelligent systems usually require additional information not generally
accepted as being a justified concern. Due to the general nature of this statement
it can be applied to a wide variety of different areas of research that may fall under
the general area of the thesis topic Adaptive Security. Such research include adaptive
access control policies where policies incorporate application specific information in
policy decisions [7], adaptive intrusion detection systems which allow individual trust
management to conserve processor resources [8], adaptive agents where the system it-
self moves between different domains and has to detect and adapt to various malicious
scenarios [9], adaptive security in resource constrained networks where appropriate
security protocols are selected at runtime based on the current network conditions
[10, 11] and threats [12], adaptive security infrastructures (ASI) where the ASI con-
sists of many security systems which cooperate to ensure minimal policy conflicts
[13, 14] and many more.
Of interest in this thesis are the concerns of system security and system perfor-
mance, in particular separating these concerns at design time and addressing the
contention between them with a intelligent Adaptive Security solution at runtime.
The type of security we address is specifically data privacy through cryptography
and ‘adaptive’ implies the ability to change the cryptographic algorithm at runtime
through an intelligent trade off policy. This is further discussed below and expounded
throughout the thesis.
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1.1 Terminology
We now take this opportunity to provide definitions of key concepts utilised through-
out the thesis.
Security
Security is the measure taken as a precaution against dangers or threats. In IT
security this is addressed as a composite set of attributes occurring concurrently.
Attributes are:
• Confidentiality: limiting disclosure of information to authorised individuals only.
• Integrity: absence of unauthorized system alterations
• Availability: accessible for authorised actions when needed
In this thesis we address all of the above attributes as they apply to the Secure
Socket Layer (SSL) protocol in a web server environment. Confidentiality is the pro-
tection provided through encryption/decryption of sensitive data. Integrity is pro-
vided by SSL through hashing and public key cryptography. Availability is addressed
through the trade-off and can protect against Denial of Service attacks by decreasing
the security.
Quality of Service (QoS)
Quality is measured as the predictability or guarantee of service delivery. In this
thesis we measure the percentage of successfully serviced requests, where success
implies a service response within a given time period.
Trade-Off
Trade-off is defined as “a balance achieved between two desirable but incompatible
features; a compromise.” In this thesis we research the trade-off between Security
and QoS as defined above. A Trade-off as defined in this Thesis exhibits a number of
characteristics. Firstly it refers to the actions taken to increase or decrease security
at the cost or benefit of QoS respectively. Secondly, in the trade-off a minimal level
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of both QoS and security is specified. Lastly, the extent and intensity of service
usage influences QoS over time and so security and QoS is traded-off to support the
maximum achievable level of security at any particular moment in time within the
stipulated security and QoS constraints.
Adaptive Security
Adapt is defined as: “make (something) suitable for a new use or purpose; mod-
ify” With reference to software systems the type of adaptation is often defined with
reference to when it is achieved. Namely, adaptive can mean static adaptation where
the system is modified at design, compile or link time. It can also refer to dynamic
adaptation where the system modifies its own behaviour at runtime.
With reference to the definition of security above and our understanding of adap-
tive we consider Adaptive Security as a runtime modification of the cryptographic
algorithm employed to secure sensitive data.
1.2 Motivation
Choosing an appropriate level of security to protect a system is inherently a trade
off exercise in maximising security whilst taking into account financial concerns as
well as client Quality of Service (QoS) constraints. We believe that this trade off is
often made implicitly in industry and has only recently come to the attention of the
research community.
Successfully evaluating security often requires many years of practical experience
as such decisions are often based on an array of abstract factors. Factors could include
the likelihood of attacks, the strength of attacks, value of the data processed, strength
of the security algorithms, trust in the algorithms and many more. Additionally
there are even ambiguities in evaluating the actual security algorithms themselves.
Current security algorithm evaluation research [15, 16] provides formulae to evaluate
the security of algorithms but they depend heavily on subjective input such as level of
trust in DES encryption, expected cryptanalytic developments, accuracy of Moore’s
law and average cost of computing power to name a few.
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Furthermore, the chosen level of security also has a direct impact on system perfor-
mance. Choosing the right level of security to meet QoS guarantees requires a great
deal of expertise and foresight. Firstly the expected QoS without security needs to be
understood well. This partly depends on the combined performance effect of system
configuration parameters, such as buffer sizes and cache expiration policies. Due to
the large number of configurable parameters and their complex interdependencies it
may be difficult to determine their combined effect on system performance. Secondly,
the expected client load on the system is also difficult to predict and plays a role in
deciding what QoS guarantees can be provided. Providing security places an addi-
tional load on the system which may be difficult to determine at design time. Not
only does the additional performance cost depend on the chosen algorithm but also
on the chosen algorithm implementation. Even once an algorithm implementation is
chosen the performance impact on the system is greatly dependant on how clients use
the system, as we will show in this thesis.
Once a security algorithm is chosen there are no guarantees that the external
factors on which the decision was based will remain constant. For example, external
threat levels are likely to change over time, as will the value of the data that clients
store on the system. The number of expected clients as well as their behaviour may
also change. New cryptanalytic developments can also severely affect the strength of
or trust in a particular algorithm. Making only one security decision can therefore in
itself leave the system at risk or break QoS guarantees.
Choosing an appropriate level of security is thus a continual trade off exercise
best accomplished at runtime through an Adaptive Security system which can take
relevant environmental factors into account before making a security decision.
1.3 Goal
In reference to the above motivational factors we formulate our goal as follows:
GOAL: Demonstrate the practical utility of Adaptive Security in
trading off security and QoS at runtime.
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In particular we note that due to the subjective and abstract factors that influence
a security decision a certain level of threat to the system inevitably remains. In this
thesis we focus on reducing this threat further by trading off security and performance
to provide better security whilst maintaining QoS constraints. A particular challenge
is to use the available resources effectively without overloading the system or breaking
client QoS constraints.
Such an automated runtime adaptation has the potential to tap into available
resources to maintain a high level of security. It can also provide timely (i.e. in
response to threats) and fine grained (i.e. based on data value) security control.
1.4 Approach
Solutions to a number of research problems need to be explored to achieve the goal
above. Firstly, the issue of how best to create an adaptive security system which
can take QoS metrics into account and then adapt security at runtime needs to be
addressed. There is also the challenge of trading off security and Quality of Service
effectively; addressing issues such as quantifying each in such a way to allow a trade-
off, analysing which contextual information most appropriately represents QoS and
constructing effective security trade-off policies.
In addressing these questions we focus on creating an adaptive security system by
extending legacy security systems with adaptive features. We also choose to consider
security systems where part of the trade-off can be studied offline through experi-
mentation and in so doing provide insight as to the expected future QoS state of the
system under adaptation.
We therefore first study current literature to elicit the implicit adaptive principles
of current adaptive security research and so provide the cornerstone for our method-
ology. The methodology addresses the challenge of extending legacy security systems
with adaptive features and the steps needed to create a trade-off policy. We apply our
methodology to the Secure Socket Layer SSL/TLS security protocol as implemented
for the industry recognised open source Web Server system called Apache. We con-
duct an offline study of the security-performance contention in the system resulting
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from its SSL security provision to clients and so gain the necessary insight to create
a runtime trade-off policy.
In summary, in this thesis we start by investigating the performance overhead of
typical security protocol implementations as well as the level of security they pro-
vide. We furthermore study the performance effect of utilising such implementations
on an Apache based server and study how the performance impact due to security
varies under different client-server conditions. Such key insights provide the basis for
a security-performance trade-off policy which allows intelligent security adaptation at
runtime based on current client-server conditions. To achieve effective runtime secu-
rity adaptation we follow our methodology to design and implement a novel Adaptive
SSL (ASSL) solution.
1.5 Contributions
The analysis and tools constituting this thesis provide the following research contri-
butions:
• A methodology detailing key steps and activities to create an adaptive security
solution from legacy non-adaptive security systems. Steps include: Establishing
a control point to leverage control of the security decision process from the exist-
ing system. Identifying a cross-cutting concern which is a measurable property
of the environment. Studying the interrelationship between security and the
cross-cutting concern in the existing system context by identifying measurable
factors which influence their relationship (This is done offline). Formulation of
a trade-off goal which is optimised based on multiple objectives, one of which is
a security objective.
The methodology specifically addresses existing security systems. Also, only
systems where the security adaptation has a direct impact on the monitored
resource are considered as they provide the necessary complexity to study a
runtime trade-off. We also note that it must be possible to gain control of the
security decision making process from the legacy system for the methodology to
be effective.
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• Ability to predict the runtime system performance behaviour resulting from a
security adaptation. This is achieved through offline experimentation which
measures the system performance states under different security algorithms and
contextual parameters. Parameters such as the requested file size, session dura-
tion and performance cost of the cryptographic algorithms are studied. Offline
analysis allows one to systematically address the complexities of such predictions
leaving the less resource intensive decisions, i.e. those supported by the offline
results, to be made at runtime. Performance outcomes of security decisions can
therefore be studied offline before any decisions need to be made at runtime. We
are thus able to use performance prediction to divine a trade-off policy that can
respect QoS and security guarantees as the outcome of the adaptation is known
beforehand.
• Design and implementation of Adaptive SSL for the Apache web server. The
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is augmented with adaptive features through the
application of our methodology and adherence to the design which accompanies
it. Adaptation concepts such as ’component based design’ and ’separation of
concerns’, as discussed in the background chapter, supports the development
of Adaptive SSL and ensures its practical utility. Adaptive SSL is shown to
be effective in supporting runtime adaptation with minimum overhead and has
been instrumental in illustrating our approach to achieve adaptive security for
non-adaptive systems.
1.6 Outline
This chapter introduced motivations and goals for an adaptive security solution as
well as detailing key thesis contributions. We now outline the primary thesis chapters:
Chapter 2 Adaptive Security covers a wide range of research areas/domains with
little shared common ground. As such we first present and discuss current Adap-
tive Security literature in this background chapter. This provides the context
for and nomenclature to describe our own work.
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Chapter 3 We focus on our security domain and undertake an in depth comparative
evaluation of current cryptographic algorithm implementations.
Chapter 4 A methodology to build a runtime adaptive security solution is detailed
in this chapter. We also consider the scope of such a methodology as well as
providing a design for the new adaptive security solution.
Chapter 5 In this chapter we detail and evaluate our Adaptive SSL solution which
facilitates runtime security adaptation between client and server based on the
design discussed in the previous chapter.
Chapter 6 We study the effects of external factors influencing server related security
cost. Insight gained through this offline study aides in formulating an adaptive
security policy and we demonstrate its effectiveness in trading off security and
performance at runtime.
Chapter 7 Lastly we summarise and recapitulate the main themes of the thesis. We
also consider possible future directions.
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Chapter 2
Background
We conclude from Chapter 1 that adaptive systems typically require additional in-
formation, not traditionally accepted as a justified concern of the system, to make
adaptation decisions. Such a general view of adaptive systems lead to a research area
which is vast, multidisciplinary and involves a wide range of systems [17]. Not only
is work related to this area far reaching but also relatively new. Almost all papers
cited in this chapter were published this side of 2000, if not within the last few years.
The combination of these factors contributes to the fact that current research in one
area of adaptive systems is often ill suited for transfer to another. With regards to
this, an adaptive systems Road Map paper published in 2008 states that “finding a
solution that should be able to fit all the purposes might be remote.” [17].
In this chapter we therefore take on the challenge of exploring the diversity of this
exciting new area and endeavor to draw together some core principles on which these
diverse adaptive systems are based. We examine what can be implied by the term
adaptive and how it is achieved. We furthermore present current Adaptive Security
literature providing a context and motivation for our research.
In the following section we firstly explore what Adaptive means and how it is
utilised in adaptive security research. We do this by bringing current adaptive security
research together under one adaptation taxonomy. Given an understanding of how
adaptivity is achieved in its many forms we then focus on the subset of systems more
closely resembling our research, namely Self-Adaptive systems.
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2.1 Adaptive
In this section we endeavour to provide a more concrete understanding of the am-
biguous term adaptive and draw together adaptive security research as they relate
to different kinds of adaptivity. In doing so we note that bringing together adaptive
security research in this fashion is to the best of our knowledge a unique compilation.
Using the adaptation taxonomy by S. M. Sadjadi et al. in [18, 19, 20] as a frame-
work, this Chapter brings together Adaptive Security research by exploring how,
when and where adaptation is utilised. For each section we discuss adaptive security
research which best demonstrates the related concept, noting that such research may
also be suited to one or more of the other sections.
2.1.1 When to adapt
Differences in adaptation techniques can be seen as a function of time [18]. Generally
speaking, techniques which allow adaptation later in the product life cycle are much
more powerful. Later adaptation does however mean that it is difficult to employ
traditional testing and formal verification techniques to ensure system consistency.
We first look at static adaptation early in the product life cycle and then move to
more dynamic types of adaptation later in the life cycle.
2.1.1.1 Static adaptation
Adaptive behavior which is hardwired into the system at development time cannot
be changed without recoding. This clearly limits the ease with which the system can
evolve over time.
Alternately the system can support customization at compile/link time. This is
typically done to make an application suitable for a particular environment during
deployment. It can be seen in traditional Linux operating systems where application
source code is compiled/linked using a makefile script to make it suitable for that
particular Linux distribution. Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) languages also
allow blocks of code to be inserted at various predefined points in the system during
compile/link time. This code may deal with other system concerns such as security,
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logging, etc. (see Section 2.1.2.2 for full description). These systems only require
recompilation or relinking to be made suitable for a new environment.
Configurable systems delay the decision on which components to use for a par-
ticular task until the component is needed. For example the Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) loads classes when the application first needs them. Hashii et al. [21] applies
this to the security domain by utilising Java’s Dynamic Classes to support reconfig-
urable security policies for mobile programs. Such programs traverse many different
systems and so would benefit greatly from the ability to adapt appropriately to each
new environment.
2.1.1.2 Dynamic adaptation
Both tunable and mutable application types initiate adaptation at runtime. Systems
which do not change their functional code at runtime but allow other crosscutting
concerns to be altered in response to current environmental conditions are considered
tunable. Examples include a paper by Brenda Timmerman [22] which considers the
issue of dynamically masking network traffic to protect against traffic analysis attacks.
It allows the cross-cutting concern of security (i.e. the amount of masking) to be
altered in response to changing security policies, which in turn is partly based on
current system load. Higher network load might result in a policy change to reduce
network masking and so free resources to deal with the increased network traffic, and
vice versa. Lawrence Teo et al. [23] describes a dynamic risk-aware access control
architecture which provides additional runtime support to firewalls by monitoring
the environment. It monitors client requests at runtime and makes intuitive risk
based assessments on each request before allowing traffic through. Similarly R.M
Venkatesan et al. [8] considers a firewall which adapts to threats by changing security
policies for each user at runtime based on Intrusion Detection System (IDS) input.
Kang et al. [24] also considers using IDS input in the context of real-time embedded
systems to allow the system to perform optimally until a real security threat occurs.
Finally M.E El-Hennawy et al. [25] also tries to alleviate security processing costs
through segmenting data and applying a different level of encryption to each segment
by varying the algorithm key size.
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Mutable systems additionally allow adaptation which dynamically alters the sys-
tem’s behavior at runtime to one that is functionally different. As mentioned above
this is a very powerful adaptation type and is typically constrained to avoid anoma-
lous system behavior across adaptations. Chunxiao Chigan et al. [10] presents one
such mutable security service for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. Not only can it change
the level of security provided but allows complete changes to security infrastructure
in response to different types of security threat.
The Adaptive Security solution presented in this thesis is a dynamic tunable solu-
tion as it enables adaptation of crosscutting concerns in response to current environ-
mental conditions. More precisely, it enables runtime security adaptation based on
current server load. This is achieved through a policy based mechanism which pro-
vides better security when resources are available whilst still respecting client Quality
of Service constraints.
2.1.2 How to adapt
This dimension of the adaptation taxonomy reflects on the techniques used to support
adaptation.
2.1.2.1 Parametrisation
Parametrisation supports adaptation through a tunable variable whose value reflects
either a user choice or environmental property. Such systems typically support static
adaptation where the adaptation logic is hardwired into the system.
Generic Authorisation and Access Control (GAA-API) [26] is one such security
system that supports adaptive authorisation through a tunable system threat level
parameter. Policies are dynamically chosen and applied based on this parameter.
2.1.2.2 Separation of concerns
Adaptation logic which is dispersed throughout the system is costly and difficult to
modify and maintain [27]. Techniques which support separation of concerns address
this problem and significantly simplify the development process. One such technique
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to separate the concerns of functional behavior, i.e. business logic, with other cross-
cutting concerns such as security, Quality of Service and fault tolerance is Aspect
Oriented Programming (AOP) [28]. This separation is achieved at development time
by defining ‘pointcuts’ in the code where the code for crosscutting concerns (or ‘as-
pects’) will be inserted at compile or runtime using an ‘aspect weaver’. This technique
supports adaptation by firstly separating the various concerns and so allowing one
‘aspect’ to be easily replaced with another at compile time (i.e. customisable static
adaptation. See Section 2.1.1). Secondly it supports tunable dynamic adaptation
by allowing aspects to be weaved in at runtime [29, 30]. Lastly it can also support
mutable adaptation by considering the adaptation itself as an aspect and so allow the
system to adapt its functionality to that which was perhaps not envisioned during de-
velopment time [31, 32]. This also requires reflection to some extent and is discussed
in the next section.
AOP is still however considered relatively new with some potential unresolved
issues [33, 6, 34, 35]. None the less Abdelkarim Erradi et al. [36] have taken these ideas
and developed AdaptiveBPEL, a policy-driven framework for adaptive web services
composition. Leveraging AOP, a mutable security framework for distributed object
middleware was developed by Ruibing Hao et al. [37].
Our Adaptive Security solution upholds the idea of separation of concerns by dis-
tinctly separating the concerns of security from that of server configuration. This
separation allows security infrastructure to be developed, changed and deployed in-
dependently and parallel to that of the server.
2.1.2.3 Computational Reflection
Computational Reflection aids adaptation by allowing an application to reason about
and alter its own structure and behavior. This is achieved through ‘introspection’
which allows the application to observe its own behavior and ‘intersession’ which
enables the application to adapt its behaviour based on the observed behavior. Both
are achieved through exposing selected details of the underlying system at a level of
abstraction that hides unnecessary details whilst still allowing changes to the system
behavior. The RUNtime Extension of Services (RUNES) middleware [38] architecture
14
utilises reflection, amongst other techniques, to provide a reconfigurable component
based architecture for networked embedded systems.
2.1.2.4 Component based design
Component based design (CBD) views the system as a group of components which
conform to a set of well defined interface specifications. Using interfaces to stan-
dardise interactions between components allows 3rd parties to independently develop
software components for later integration with the system. These are also known as
“Commodity-off-the-shelf” (COTS) components as they can be ready-made for use in
any system that adheres to the interface specifications. Components facilitate adap-
tation either through static recomposition, where components are selected at compile
time, or dynamic recomposition, where new components can be bound to the system
at runtime.
Our Adaptive Security solution fosters the notion of CBD by enabling security
adaptation through a standard HTTP based interface. This allows any 3rd party
which adheres to the interface to adapt the security.
2.1.3 Where to adapt
The last dimension of the taxonomy focuses on where in the system the adaptation is
realised. In particular, we focus on Application, Middleware and Operating System
layers.
2.1.3.1 Application Layer
Adaptive code at this level provides adaptive support to programs which are not
generally tied to a particular middleware platform. The following papers address
various security issues at the application layer by providing infrastructure support
through leveraging techniques presented in Section 2.1.2.
The Willow Architecture [39] supports fault and intrusion tolerance for critical
distributed applications. It does this through a combination of component based
design and control loop support. In the former distributed services are considered
components which adhere to a specific API and can thus be dynamically exchanged
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for other services at runtime and the latter provides support to monitor, diagnose
and respond to application state changes.
The security API for the Strata software platform [40] allows dynamic adaptation
of security policies at runtime based on system events. Their Aspect Oriented ap-
proach allows authorisation policies to be dynamically weaved into the application
code at runtime.
Leveraging reflection B. Hashii et al. [21] developed an application layer Extensible
Security Infrastructure to support dynamic access control policies.
Adaptive Trust Negotiation and Access Control (ATNAC) [41] supports security
adaptation through parameterising their framework with threat-level and suspicion-
level parameters. These parameters are used by the Generic Authorisation and Access
Control API (GAA-API) [26] and TrustBuilder [42] to provide an adaptive access
control and trust negotiation framework.
Through the use of Component Based Design and the concept of separation of con-
cerns the Analyse and Plan components of the control loop for our Adaptive Security
solution is realised at the Application level. Server load data is analysed, adaptation
policies applied and appropriate instructions formulated to trade off security and
performance.
2.1.3.2 Middleware
Middleware provides adaptive support just below the application layer. Schmidt [43]
further breaks this layer down into four layered sections as discussed below starting
with the lowest middleware layer and moving up:
The Host-Infrastructure layer encapsulates and enhances lower level communica-
tion and concurrency mechanisms to hide the heterogeneity of the Operating System
and hardware. This service is exposed through an API to the higher levels. Examples
of adaptive middleware at this layer include ACE [44], Rocks [45] and MetaSockets
[46].
The Distribution layer provides a programming abstraction to the layers above,
allowing distributed applications to be written in a similar fashion to stand alone
programs. That is, function calls on remote objects are free from hard coded depen-
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dencies on their location, target programming language, target OS, etc. Adaptive
middleware at this layer includes TAO [47], DynamicTAO [48] and OpenORB [49].
Common Services provide high level domain independent components that provide
common services such as load balancing, logging, security, fault tolerance, real-time
scheduling, etc. QuO [50], IRL [51] and FRIENDS [52] are examples of adaptive
middleware at this layer. The domain independent Monitor and Execution compo-
nents of our Adaptive Security solution are implemented at this level. A runtime
adaptive Secure Socket Layer (SSL) service adapts a subset of client SSL sessions in
response to application level requests. Current system load is also made available to
the application layer.
Finally, the Domain-Services top layer is tailored to the particular domain and so
can only be reused for that domain. Boeing Bold Stroke [53] open architecture for
mission-computing avionics capabilities is an example of middleware at this layer.
2.1.3.3 Operating Systems
Operating Systems (OS) is the lowest layer we consider. This is a vast field of re-
search which we will not attempt to cover comprehensively. We do however take this
opportunity to make note of particular adaptive security research in these areas.
H. Hinton et al. [12] developed a Security Adaptation Manager that adaptively
protects the OS against buffer overflow based stack-smashing attacks. Complete
copies of the system, each compiled with different levels of security in mind, are
maintained. The system initially operates in a less secure/more performant state.
System events are monitored and once an attack or sequence of potential attacks
are observed future client requests are diverted to a more secure/less performant
compiled implementation. Singh et al. [54] investigates the security-performance
contention in the Access Control mechanism of Storage Area Network file systems. A
compromise is found by developing trust/distrust in users based on their behaviour
over time. Trustworthy users only require minimal security checks and so free up
system resources.
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2.2 Self-Adaptive
Having gained a deeper understanding of how adaptivity is achieved in current adap-
tive security literature we now further analyse those security systems which are con-
sidered to be self-adaptive. We first consider self-adaptive systems more generally,
noting what current research considers as key key components of such systems. In
section 2.2.1 we then analyse current adaptive security systems in that light.
A distinguishing characteristic of self-adaptive systems relates to how the adap-
tation is initiated and in particular by whom. One might think of this entity as the
‘composer’ who uses these techniques to adapt the system. The composer might be
human, a system administrator or developer, or a piece of software. Software sys-
tems can be considered on a sliding scale from manual (human composers) to fully
autonomic systems (software composers). The first level represents a system which
requires skilled professionals to install, monitor, manage and replace. In contrast, the
other side of the sliding scale represents an autonomic system which can automati-
cally take appropriate actions based on business policies and objectives using available
internal or external information [55]. An analogy for such systems can be found in
biological systems such as the human nervous system which frees our brain from the
burden of dealing with lower level, but still vital, functions such as heart rate and
body temperature [56]. Autonomic systems are also commonly known as Self-star or
Self-* [57] systems and can be categorised under four general Self-CHOP [58] charac-
teristics (namely Self-Configuring, Self-Healing, Self-Optimizing and Self-Protecting
[56]).
Such Self-Adaptive systems can be static or dynamic (see Section 2.1.1) in terms of
when adaptation occurs but as autonomicity increases so does the need for a software
representation of the decision making process. This process can be seen as a feedback-
or control loop. It allows systems to make their own adaptation decisions without
human intervention.
The generic autonomic feedback loop considers all stages of the decision making
process [59]. The cycle starts with the collection of relevant environmental data. Is-
sues such as the cost and frequency of collection should be addressed here as monitor-
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ing itself could overload the system or negate performance benefits achieved through
adaptation [17]. Collected data reflects the current state of the system and is analysed
in the next stage. The analytical stage deals with modelling the current and possibly
future state of the system and applying various rules and theories to the collected
data. In the next stage a decision is made, potentially amongst alternatives presented
in the previous stage using techniques such as risk analysis or decision theory, to reach
a desirable state. This stage could also consider the impact of each alternative on
other components sharing the same resources, also bearing in mind the duration and
overhead of the adaptation process itself [17]. Finally the appropriate adaptation
decision is acted on. The impact data of the adaptation can then be collected and
used as feedback for the next control cycle.
Even though such feedback- or control loops have had much success in different
branches of engineering, such as control theory [60], it is still unclear whether general
principles of this discipline can be applied directly to self-adaptive software systems
[17]. Control theory deals well with closed systems whose components and properties
are well known and described using various linear or nonlinear mathematical models.
More general systems however (e.g. discrete and continuous, time-varying, having
delayed or uncertain information) whose structure is also perhaps not fully known is
problematic in control theory even if they can be characterised mathematically [59].
Not only is control theory somewhat limited but the feedback loop is often an
emergent property of the system rather than being explicitly represented in the sys-
tem structure. In particular, autonomic systems can be organised into two groups,
many adaptive systems sharing aspects of both. Nomenclature has not yet been
standardised and so groups can either be top down/bottom up, weak(centralised)/
strong(decentralised)[17], tightly coupled/decoupled [61], etc. For the former the sys-
tem is viewed in a top down fashion, most likely having some central point of control
maintaining an explicit representation of the system and making adaptation decisions
based on some higher level business goals. Such systems are more likely to suffer from
scalability problems [17]. The latter is a system viewed in a bottom up manner where
there is no central control but each component has a set of duties which, when view-
ing all components as a whole, produces some emergent behaviour. As such it can be
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considered more difficult to predict and verify this emergent behaviour. It may also
be an indication why many adaptive software system designers acknowledge the feed-
back properties of such systems but do not represent these control loops explicitly in
design documents. Control loops are also often hidden in design documents through
various abstractions intended to hide complexity. These give rise to a lack of visi-
bility which can cause designers to overlook key control aspects and makes software
validation and verification increasingly difficult [62].
In a bid to deal with the complexities of modern day computing systems IBM has
taken the above challenges to heart and developed an “Architectural Blueprint for
Autonomic Computing” [63]. At the core of this blueprint is the ‘autonomic manager’
which can be seen as a derivative of the popular engineering Model Reference Adap-
tive Control (MRAC) [60] control loop. The autonomic manager is an architecture
that implements the generic feedback loop. First the Monitor component collects
appropriate data from the managed resources through sensors. Data is correlated,
filtered and/or aggregated and the discovered symptom is passed to the Analyse com-
ponent. Symptoms and other data may also be stored in a shared knowledge base.
The analyser determines whether a change needs to be made based on the shared
knowledge (potentially a policy) and the symptoms. A change request is passed to
the Plan component if necessary. The planner generates the necessary command or
workflows in the form of a change plan which is passed to the Execute component.
The executor performs the change plan on the manage resource using the effectors.
The knowledge base may be updated if necessary.
Thus far only a small step has been taken to make feedback loops more visible and
explicit in adaptive software systems [62] and it would be a worthwhile endeavor to
further mine the rich area of control engineering to further ground adaptive systems
research [17].
In recognition of rapidly changing environments and the need for explicit feedback
loop representation L. Marcus [13] introduces the concept of an Adaptive Security
Infrastructure (ASI). It is considered to be a hierarchical structure consisting of many
autonomic systems. The paper focus’ on the foundations for local and global policy
specification in such an infrastructure.
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Alexander Shnitko [14] combines research in [13, 64, 65] to produce a general
model for an adaptive Complex Information System (CIS). The model also has clear
similarities to a feedback loop or autonomic manager. Lastly, Carlo Montangero et
al. [66] discusses an approach to the logic specification of an ASI in the secure mobile
networking domain using ∆DSTL(x) spatial-temporal logic. The contributions in
this thesis fit within this class of systems but we will discuss that in greater length
in Section 2.2.2.
Motivated by the the fact that the feedback loop mechanism is often not explicitly
considered when designing self-adaptive systems we analyse current adaptive security
literature with respect to the IBM’s autonomic manager in Section 2.2.1. This is
followed by a discussion of our contribution in light of these findings in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Feedback loop
In order to bound the discussion we now focus on adaptive security research in partic-
ular. Specifically, we address the feedback loop properties of current adaptive security
systems in context of IBM’s autonomic manager in this section. Each component of
the autonomic manager is considered in turn, discussing if and how current adaptive
security systems account for these components.
A summary of our findings is presented in Table 2.1. Each component is accounted
for and an additional column, namely “feedback”, is added to explicitly address the
fact that the impact of the adaptation on the security system serves as feedback for
the next control loop cycle. In other words, when security is adapted through the
Execute component the Monitor component’s measurements are affected in the next
feedback loop cycle because of the adaptation. With reference to Table 2.1 we now
explore how current adaptive security systems address each component in turn. These
papers are chosen as they most closely represent our background discussion as well
as the various aspects of our research contributions.
Execute
The Execute component represents the security adaptation event itself and as such
we find that all Adaptive Security systems minimally support at least this part of the
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Table 2.1: Feedback loop components
Paper Execute Monitor Analyse/Plan Feedback
Adaptive SSL [67] Yes Active Offline Yes
Authenticast [11] Yes Active Online Yes
Sang H. Son et al. [68] Yes Active Online Yes
B. Timmerman [22] Yes Active Online Yes
Kang et al. [24] Yes Active Offline Yes
C. Chigan et al. [10] Yes Passive Offline
AEF [23] Yes Passive Online
EAC [8] Yes Active Offline
SAM [12] Yes Passive Offline
Sigh et al. [54] Yes Passive Online
ADME/AF schema [7] Yes Passive Online
El-Hennawy et al. [25] Yes
feedback loop. Even the “Adaptive Security/Performace encryption system” by El-
Hennawy et al. [25] addresses this core need when adapting between different key
sizes for the encryption of single files. Even though they do consider the performance
cost/benefits of such an adaptation they do not monitor its effect on the current
system performance, nor make adaptation decisions based on such insights.
From Table 2.1 one can clearly see that the Execute component is not an overlooked
consideration when creating Adaptive Security systems and is a key component in
enabling security adaptation in an Adaptive Security solution.
Monitor
With regard to the runtime monitoring of the system state we found that there
were two types of monitoring taking place.
The first can be classified as Passive monitoring. The system waits for an event
to occur. Adaptive access control systems are particularly suited to this type of
monitoring as the monitoring system must wait for a user to access the system. L.
Teo et al. created an Authorisation Enforcement Facility (AEF [23]) for network
access management which provides passive monitoring by scanning incoming packets
for suspicious content or behaviour. Sigh et al. [54] also uses passive monitoring
when building trust/distrust in users when they access the Storage Area Network file
system. Lastly, K. Beznosov proposed ADME/AF schema [7] to enable application
specific access control in middleware. Passive monitoring comes into affect when the
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application and middleware layer interact.
The second is Active monitoring and involves the monitoring system proactively
polling to retrieve sufficient data. This can most clearly be seen in adaptive security
systems where the system resources such as load or performance is monitored. The
Authenticast system [11] actively monitors system load to provide dynamic authen-
tication for streaming services.
The Enhanced Access Control system (EAC [8]) makes use of both techniques
to detect threats. It actively analyses audit trail data and passively monitors user
activity when they connect to the firewall.
We note that Active monitoring is significantly more resource intensive and as such
could negate the performance benefits achieved through adaptation [17]. Attributes
affecting such costs such as the frequency of monitoring and cost of calculating per-
formance averages are not specifically addressed by the above papers. Monitoring
provides current runtime information to aid in security adaptation decisions and so
forms another key component in the feedback loop.
Analyse/Plan
At the core of the decision process is the Analyse component. According IBM’s
Autonomic blueprint [63] all components need not always be present and since the
output of the Analyse component is often a adaptation decision for the Execution
component we consider the Analyse and Plan components together.
As the analysis can be very system specific, this component can be realised in a
myriad of different ways. We make the following observations regarding trends in this
area.
Firstly, even though the analysis occurs at runtime a number of systems require
additional offline measurements or computations to aid in the runtime (i.e. online)
analysis. Such decision aids need to be pre-computed offline before the system can be
utilised. C. Chigan et al.’s paper on “Resource-aware Self-Adaptive Security Provi-
sioning in Ad Hoc Networks” [10] introduces an offline optimal secure protocol selec-
tion module to analyse and select the most cost effective stack of security protocols
from various layers of the OSI stack to be utilised together at runtime. This selection
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is a costly process which may cause performance degradation in the running system
and is thus done offline. The Enhanced Access Control (EAC [8]) system makes use
of offline audit trails to learn what can be classed as normal user behaviour. Rules
derived from this processor intensive process is then used at runtime in EAC Fire-
wall rules. Lastly, the Security Adaptation Manager [12] can switch to a more secure
version of the system when a threat is detected. Multiple versions of the system is
compiled and maintained offline, each with different security charateristics, enabling
the system to choose between them at runtime. In all the papers above we see that
the analysis is a resource intensive activity and as such best achieved offline.
Secondly we note that compared to offline analysis the complexity of the online
analysis process is limited due to time constraints and processing resource limita-
tions. The Authorisation Enforcement Facility (AEF [23]) uses a simple threshold
value denoting initial trust in the user together with threat level data from the mon-
itor component to make runtime security adaptation decisions. Sang H. Son et al.
in their paper on “An Adaptable Security Manager for Real-Time Transactions” [68]
consider the cryptographic security of real-time database transactions. They devel-
oped an Adaptable Security Manager which utilises a simple feedback mechanism to
link transaction deadline completions, as reported by the monitoring component, with
a security level. If too many deadlines are missed a percentage of transactions are
moved to a lower security level to free resources, and vice versa. Authenticast [11] also
links security level with available resources through a feedback mechanism. In this
case authentication of multimedia streams is considered. If the rate of authentication
falls below the stream arrival rate, security is adapted through a set of heuristics to
reduce resource consumption and so allow the equilibrium between arrival rate and
authentication to be restored. Heuristics include only authenticating a percentage of
the incoming stream, delaying authentication and changing the security algorithm.
We also note that the above mentioned papers merely report on the performance
cost savings of using heuristics, percentage based decisions and threshold values but
do not consider the performance effect of such decisions as part of the decision pro-
cess. To make an informed decision and effectively decide whether security should be
adapted one must know the performance effect of adapting the security on the system
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before doing so. Taking this into consideration may however be too computationally
expensive for online analysis. Offline analysis may also find this difficult due to the
online nature of the adaptivity and its performance effect.
Feedback
The final aspect of Self-Adaptive systems to consider is the notion that changing
the security has an impact on the environment which in turn serves as feedback to
the next iteration of the feedback loop. We found that this is not always the case
as the adaptive security system may monitor a resource which is not affected by
the security adaptation. This is for example the case for the Security Adaptation
Manager [12] which adapts to a more secure version of the software when a security
threat is detected. The threats are monitored and reacted to in the same way in this
feedback loop as in the next iteration of the loop.
Kang et al. in their paper entitled “Towards security and QoS optimization in
real-time embedded systems” [24] the system performance is affected when a level
of security is selected to encrypt the transmission. This in turn will have a direct
impact on future decisions as the system is now in a less/more performant state and
more/less capable of meeting the real-time deadlines.
Authenticast [11] is another such system where adapting the security (i.e. the au-
thentication of real time data streams) directly affects the future system performance.
As such different decisions may need to be made on the next iteration of the feedback
loop.
B. Timmerman in her paper “A security model for dynamic adaptive traffic mask-
ing” [22] addresses the issue of adaptive network traffic masking to protect against
traffic analysis attacks. The amount of masking is sensitive to the current network
load and also affects the network load directly when the amount of masking is adapted.
Changes in the masking frequency therefore has a direct impact on the adaptation
decision for the next feedback loop iteration.
Lastly we consider Sang H. Son et al.’s paper on “An Adaptable Security Man-
ager for Real-Time Transactions” [68] where the cryptographic security of real-time
database transactions is addressed. Transaction deadline completions are measured
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and a percentage of the transactions are adapted to a lower security level if deadlines
are missed, and vice versa. Adapting security affects system performance and there-
fore by implication how many deadlines are met. The impact caused by the security
adaptation therefore provides feedback for the next feedback loop iteration.
We feel it is important to address this aspect of the feedback process as it is often
overlooked in current literature. It also adds significant additional complexity to the
Analysis/Plan components and is therefore an interesting research area to explore.
When considering the papers in this area we also note that even though the adaptation
has a direct effect on the environmental attributes that are monitored by the Monitor
component in the next iteration of the feedback loop, the adaptation itself does not
explicitly take the future state of the system into account when making such decisions
in the current iteration of the feedback loop. Amongst other things we address this
in our contribution discussion next.
2.2.2 Contribution discussion
In this thesis we take the ideas discussed in this chapter one step further to create
a methodology capable of extending standard legacy security systems, making them
fully self-adaptive. The methodology provides steps and considerations to address
all the components of the autonomic feedback loop and in so doing move adaptation
decisions for existing non-adaptive security systems from design or deployment time
to runtime. In particular we advocate a fully Self-Adaptive system where the security
adaptation has a direct affect on the monitored resource (i.e. The impact caused by
the security adaptation provides feedback for the next feedback loop iteration.). To
study the interrelationship between security and the monitored resource we introduce
an offline element to the Analysis/Plan component. As we will see, studying this
relationship through an offline measurement based approach equips us with the tools
to predict the system performance behaviour resulting from a security adaptation.
This aids greatly in developing intelligent and effective adaptation policies. We note
that the type of monitoring to be used is not stipulated in the methodology.
In this thesis we apply our methodology to the SSL/TLS security protocol [69].
In the first row of Table 2.1 one can see that our new Adaptive SSL (ASSL) system
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has an Active monitor component (i.e. processing resources is monitored), an offline
element to the Analyse/Plan component (from which our security-performance trade-
off policies are devised) and exhibits the aforementioned ’Feedback’ property. The
offline element of the Analyse/Plan component is of particular interest in this im-
plementation. Through offline experimentation we measure the system states under
different security algorithms and in so doing enable us to predict the future system
performance state resulting from a security adaptation. This results in intelligent and
effective adaptation policies. In context of the taxonomy in Section 2.1 our ASSL so-
lution can be described as a dynamic tunable solution. Concepts such as Component
Based Design and Separation of Concerns aided in developing the Monitor, Analyse,
Plan and Execute components of the feedback loop which themselves are distributed
over the Middleware and Application domain layers.
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Chapter 3
Cryptographic Algorithm
Implementations
In aid of exploring the contention between security and performance we investigate
the cryptographic algorithms required to secure client-server interactions. We study
both the level of security they provide and the performance cost of doing so.
Algorithms typically provide the following security guarantees: message integrity
to ensure messages are unaltered during transit; message confidentiality to ensure
message content remain secret; non-repudiation to ensure that the sending party
cannot deny sending the received message; and authentication to prove sender and/or
receiver identity.
We first introduce the cryptographic algorithms needed to achieve the above secu-
rity guarantees and show how they are combined to provide a more effective security
solution. We furthermore study current implementations thereof and show that per-
formance overhead varies significantly amongst implementations.
3.1 Cryptographic algorithms
In this section we detail the most prevalent cryptographic algorithms used to achieve
message integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation and authentication. We also show
how these algorithms are used together to build a more effective security solution.
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3.1.1 Symmetric cryptography
Symmetric cryptography tries to ensure message confidentiality by encrypting the
message (the plaintext) using a secret key to produce an encrypted version of the
message (the cipher text), which is then sent instead of the original message [70].
Message integrity is implicitly provided, as altering the cipher text would result in
an illegible decrypted message. Symmetric refers to the fact that the same secret
key is required to decrypt the message on the recipient’s side [71]. Typical symmet-
ric encryption algorithms include DES, Triple DES, RC2, RC5, Twofish, Blowfish,
IDEA and AES. Most symmetric algorithms can operate in different modes, most
common of which are Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) or Electronic Codebook
Mode (ECB). The former is considered more secure as it ensures that encrypting the
same plaintext never produces the same cipher text. An inherent problem in using
symmetric cryptography is the key distribution problem; since the same secret key is
used to decrypt the message, one must find a way to securely transport the key from
sender to recipient.
3.1.2 Asymmetric cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography provides the same message security guarantees as symmet-
ric cryptography, but additionally provides the non-repudiation guarantee. Asymmet-
ric refers to the fact that different keys are used for encryption and decryption. One
key is kept secret (private key) and the other is made public (public key), and both
are unique. The recipient’s public key should be used during the encryption process
to ensure message confidentiality as only the recipient has the necessary secret key to
decrypt the message. If, however, the message is encrypted using the sender’s private
key the sender cannot deny sending the message as his private key is unique and is
only known to him. Typical asymmetric algorithms include RSA, ElGamal and DSA.
Asymmetric cryptography is extremely powerful, but this comes at a cost. Especially
for longer messages and keys, it is much slower than its symmetric cryptography
counterparts [72].
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3.1.3 Hashing
Hashing tries to ensure message integrity by producing a condensed version of the
message, known as the message digest, which is unique to that message. The hash-
ing algorithm is publicly known and so the recipient can perform the same hash
on the received message, to produce another message digest, and compare it to the
received digest to asses whether the original message has been altered. Typical hash-
ing algorithms include MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512. Hashing does not provide confidentiality, non-repudiation or authentica-
tion. On its own, hashing does not provide message integrity either as both the hash
and the message could be replaced by a 3rd party and so prevent the recipient from
detecting the attack. The next section explains how hashing is utilised to ensure
message integrity.
3.1.4 Hybrid security system
The techniques detailed above are combined to achieve a more effective security so-
lution through signing, verifying, encryption and decryption. They are combined as
follows:
The key, in symmetric cryptography, can be securely transported using public key
cryptography by encrypting the symmetric key using the receiver’s public key. The
receiver, and only the receiver, can then first decrypt the symmetric key using his
private key and then decrypt the message using the decrypted symmetric key. Note
that only the symmetric key, which is relatively short, is encrypted using public key
cryptography thus reducing encryption overhead.
The message digest, produced by the hash function, can be encrypted using an
asymmetric cryptography algorithm to avoid an interception attack. Thus, if the
message digest is encrypted using the sender’s private key, only the message can be
replaced during transit and not the message digest, since the interceptor does not
have the sender’s private key to encrypt the new message digest.
Generating a message digest and then encrypting the message digest using a private
key is referred to as signing the message. Decrypting the message digest using the
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sender’s public key, generating a new message digest of the received message and
then comparing the digests is called verifying the message. The performance results
of these two techniques, among others, are analysed in this chapter.
Sender authentication is achieved when the sender’s public key is signed by a mu-
tually trusted 3rd party. The receiver can then verify the public key as the 3rd party’s
public key is trusted.
3.1.4.1 RSA
Understanding the security implications and performance results in Section 3.2 re-
quires a deeper understanding of public key cryptography. In particular RSA [73],
which was developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977. We
do not explain all the details of RSA, but instead focus on the particular use of RSA
as detailed above.
The algorithm [74] [75]
• Choose 2 large primes p and q such that pq = N
• Select 2 integers e and d such that ed = 1 mod φ(N)
– Where φ(N ) = (p-1)(q-1) is Euler’s phi (or totient) function of N
N is called the modulus, e the public exponent and d the private exponent. The
public key is the pair (N, e) which is made public and the private key is the pair (N,
d) which is kept secret. RSA encryption and decryption explained in context of the
above sections is expressed as follows:
Encryption:
The symmetric key M :
Encrypted key = Me mod n
The message digest M :
Encrypted digest = Md mod n
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Decryption:
The symmetric key C :
Decrypted key = Cd mod n
The message digest C :
Decrypted digest = Ce mod n
Where M is the key or digest converted to an integer according to RFC3447 [76],
C the encrypted key or digest and n the particular modulus, chosen to be either 512,
1024, 2048, 3072 or 4096 bits.
When studying performance, it should be noted that encrypting the key and en-
crypting the message digest is not the same function as one uses the public and the
other the private exponent. Therefore, encrypting the symmetric key and decrypting
the message digest (in the verification process) is mathematically equivalent as they
both use the public exponent. The same can be said for encrypting the message di-
gest (in the signing process) and decrypting the symmetric key as they both use the
private exponent. RSA operation time greatly depends on the length of e and d [77],
since longer exponents incur much larger time and therefore processing overhead.
In the following two chapters we consider how the length of the public and private
exponents affect security as many security mechanisms exploit this to achieve faster
symmetric key encryption/decryption and message signing/verification.
Smaller public exponent
The public exponent e is used in symmetric key encryption and message verifi-
cation. The smallest possible value for e is 3 [78]. This can however weaken RSA
confidentiality assertions. In particular, if the length |M | of the message is such that
|M | < e√N the plaintext can easily be recovered [74]. Hastad’s broadcast attack can
be mounted if k cipher texts, encrypted with the same public exponent, can be col-
lected such that k ≥ e. [78]. The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) can then be
used to recover the plaintext message [79, 78]. A defence against such attacks would
be to pad the message using some random bits [80]. Coppersmith imposed further
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restrictions on this in his Short Pad Attack which concludes that for e = 3 an attack
can still be mounted, even though a random set of bits are used, if the pad length
is less than 1
9
of the message length [78]. The Public-Key Cryptography Standards
RFC (RFC3447: PKCS]1 [76]) does however propose the use of Optimal Asymmetric
Encryption Padding (OAEP) [80] for new applications and PKCS1-v1 5 for backward
compatibility with existing applications.
Although e = 3 can provide adequate security, if necessary precautions are taken,
the current recommendation is e = 216 + 1 [78] which is still small, requiring only
17 multiplications, but big enough to solve the above problems at the cost of a slight
increase in encryption time. Short public exponents are not however a concern for
signature schemes [79, 74].
Smaller private exponent
A shorter private exponent d would result in faster key decryption and message
signing. Typically the private exponent is the same length as the modulus regardless
of the public exponent length. Wiener [81] has however shown that if d < 1
3
N0.24 the
private exponent can be obtained from the public key (N, e). More recently, Boneh
and Durfree have shown this to be closer to d < N0.292 [82, 75] and predicted the
likely final result to be closer to d < N0.5 [78, 82].
Other techniques used to decrease algorithm operation time include the use of
the Chinese Remainder Theorem [78], know as RSA-CRT, which is said to be ap-
proximately 4 times faster than using standard RSA algorithms [75]. Rebalanced
RSA-CRT can also be used and tries to shift the cost towards the usage of the public
exponent e [83, 81].
3.2 Performance analysis
This section studies the relative performance overhead between the different security
algorithms discussed above and in particular shows how the choice of implementation
can have a significant impact on their final performance cost. We first look at cryp-
tography software on the client side and show how choosing either the standard Java
Sun Cryptography Extensions [84] or the Java Cryptix Libraries [85] can significantly
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influence the expected algorithm performance. Secondly we evaluate the supported
algorithms on the server side (OpenSSL [86]) and show how these vary in performance
not only compared to the client side implementations but also versions of the same
software. Lastly we consider the security and performance of Verisign’s TSIK toolkit
which was recently acquired by the Apache Software Foundation [87]. It is a hybrid
security system (see Section 3.1.4) used to facilitate Web Services security. As far as
we are aware this is the only performance study of the TSIK toolkit.
We note that parts of the results are based on the MSc dissertation of P. Tomlinson
[88], others are obtained by the author [89]. The results have been published as a joint
publication [90]. To achieve a stand-alone discussion, these and additional results are
presented in this chapter. In particular Figures in section 3.2.1 are by Tomlinson and
all Figures in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are by the author.
3.2.1 Java Cryptography Extensions & Java Cryptix libraries
This section details a performance evaluation of the most common cryptographic
algorithms for each cryptographic technique. Sun Java Cryptography Extensions [84]
with libraries from Sun (referred to hereafter as JCE) as well as Java Cryptix Libraries
for JCE [85] (referred to hereafter as Cryptix) are used for this purpose.
All experiments were conducted on a 1GHz machine with 256MB RAM running
Linux Fedora Core. For each experiment a 1,137 byte plaintext file was used. All
results for symmetric and asymmetric algorithms include key generation, algorithm
initialisation and message encryption times. The experiments were repeated several
times with negligible variance in the results.
The results presented suggest that RSA-1024 and SHA-256, with 1024 bit key size
and 256 bit digest length respectively, are the most suitable cryptographic algorithms
for use during transactions in systems with performance constraints. Almost any of
the symmetric algorithms could be selected, but IDEA was shown to be the fastest
in our evaluation.
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3.2.1.1 Symmetric cryptography
This section details a comparative performance evaluation of a subset of symmet-
ric encryption algorithms. Using Cryptix we furthermore investigate whether either
Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) or Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) boasts a
performance advantage. 128 bit key size was used for all algorithms with the excep-
tion of DES (56 bits), Triple DES (112 bits) and Skipjack (80 bits) as they require
fixed key sizes. Unless stated CBC mode was used.
Algorithms
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Figure 3.1: Average time to encrypt a 1137B file using JCE libraries from Sun
Looking at Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the first observation to make is that there are
significant differences between the observed durations shown in each figure; JCE
took much longer than Cryptix for the same algorithm. As an example consider
the encryption time of ∼180ms for AES in JCE (Figure 3.1) and ∼40ms for AES
in Cryptix (Figure 3.2). The implementation therefore has a large impact on the
efficiency of the algorithm execution. This is further emphasized when individual
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Figure 3.2: Average time to encrypt a 1137B file using Cryptix distributions
algorithms are compared. Naively one would expect that the 112 bit Triple DES (3
DES) would take twice as long as the 56 bit DES. However, this is evidently not
the case, being only about 25% slower in Cryptix and only very marginally slower in
JCE. Clearly this is influenced by the implementation, and conceivably Java Virtual
Machine optimisations are also playing a part in apparently “speeding up” Triple
DES.
The algorithm which performed the best in our evaluation was the International
Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). According to Schneier [91], IDEA is approxi-
mately twice as fast as DES; in our experiments it was closer to three times as fast.
Perhaps surprisingly, Blowfish was much slower, only a little better than DES and
slower than algorithms such as Skipjack [92] and Serpent. Blowfish was designed to
be fast and to require little memory [91], but we did not find this Cryptix distribution
particularly efficient in our experimental set up. The Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [93] performed particularly badly in the JCE distribution, but less poorly in
the Cryptix distribution. We were unable to satisfactorily explain this difference,
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except as further evidence of how the implementation of an algorithm can severely
impact the actual performance.
What is not evident in these plots is the relative security of the different algorithms.
In this respect key length is a good indicator, and so DES and Skipjack with key
lengths of 56 and 80 bits respectively may be considered potentially less secure than
others. Overall therefore it appears that IDEA is the best choice among the symmetric
algorithms tested, as it provides adequate security as well as a fast execution time.
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Figure 3.3: A comparison of symmetric algorithms operating in ECB mode and CBC mode
Figure 3.3 clearly indicates that neither mode shows a significant performance
advantage. It would therefore seem prudent to use CBC mode during message en-
cryption as discussed in Section 3.1.1.
37
02000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
DSA RSA-512 RSA-765 RSA-1024 RSA-1536 RSA-2048 Diffe Hellman-
512
Diffe Hellman-
765
Asymmetric Algorithm
A
v e
r a
g e
 T
i m
e  
( m
s )
Figure 3.4: Average time to encrypt a 1137B file using public key algorithms
3.2.1.2 Asymmetric cryptography
The results presented in Figure 3.4 were obtained using the standard Java Cryptog-
raphy Extensions (JCE). The graph shows the average time to generate keys and
process 1,137 bytes of data. Firstly we note that the increase in processing time is
more than linear for RSA as key size increases. It can also be seen that the 1024
bit Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [93] outperforms both RSA-1024 and RSA-
765. DSA is therefore a good option for signing data. DSA can however only be
used for non-repudiation purposes whereas RSA can be used for both encryption and
non-repudiation.
3.2.1.3 Hashing
Java Cryptix Libraries were used in this experiment. All MD algorithms has a digest
length of 128 bits, 160 bits for SHA (unless otherwise stated) and 192 bits for Tiger.
As can be seen in Figure 3.5, SHA-1 significantly outperforms all other considered
algorithms. Unfortunately SHA-1 has recently been shown to be less secure than
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Figure 3.5: Average time to generate a message digest
initially anticipated and SHA-256 is currently recommended [94]. RACE Integrity
Primitives Evaluation Message Digest (RIPEMD) with digest lengths of 128 and 160
bits have been developed to replace the 128 bit MD algorithms. Both RIPEMD
algorithms seem to achieve comparable performance to that of SHA-256, though
clearly have shorter digest lengths and so are potentially less secure.
3.2.1.4 Summary
A comparative evaluation of the standard JCE libraries and Cryptix libraries for the
main symmetric, asymmetric and hashing algorithms have shown that the chosen
implementation plays a significant part in the expected performance of the particular
algorithm. In particular, JCE performs worse than Cryptix for the same algorithm
(see Figure 3.1 and 3.2). The symmetric encryption algorithm IDEA has been found
to have particularly good performance and 3DES showed a performance cost not that
much worse than DES (Figure 3.2). Clear choices for asymmetric encryption and
hashing are RSA-1024 and SHA-256 respectively.
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3.2.2 OpenSSL libraries
This section details our evaluation of algorithm implementations for each crypto-
graphic algorithm supported on the server side. In particular we evaluate two ver-
sions of the OpenSSL libraries, namely 0.9.7f and 0.9.8d. We show that even amongst
different versions of the same software algorithm performance can vary greatly.
All experiments were conducted on a Pentium III 866MHz machine with 512Mb
RAM using the Linux “openssl speed” utility [95]. Figure 3.6 exhibit 90% confidence
intervals of 60KB/s or less with the exception of 0.9.8d AES-128 and AES-192 with
intervals of 400KB/s or less. Figure 3.7 shows 90% confidence intervals of 2KB/s
or less, Figure 3.8 90% confidence intervals of 30KB/s or less and Figure 3.9 90%
confidence intervals of 300KB/s or less.
We find that the particular implementation has a significant impact on the over-
all algorithm performance and so performance assumptions about known fast/slow
algorithms can be misleading. Symmetric algorithm AES-128 and hashing algorithm
MD4 performs particularly well for the newer 0.9.8d version whilst, compared to the
client side Java implementations, SHA-1 performs poorly for both implementations.
We also note that algorithm performance results are measured in data throughput
(kB/s) and not in overall processing time (ms) as in Section 3.2.1. When comparing
these results with those in Section 3.2.1 we keep in mind that an increase in through-
put indicates a faster algorithm implementation whereas an increase in processing
time indicates a slower implementation.
3.2.2.1 Symmetric cryptography
OpenSSL supports a wide variety of symmetric algorithms as can be seen in Figure
3.6.
Figure 3.6 shows that AES in particular has benefitted from a significant perfor-
mance increase in the new 0.9.8d implementation. Where AES is one of the slowest
implementations in the Cryptix and standard JCE implementations (Section 3.2.1)
it is the fastest in OpenSSL, even surpassing the typically fast Blowfish algorithm.
The relative algorithm performances of the older 0.9.7f implementation is however in
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of OpenSSL symmetric algorithms
concurrence with Cryptix implementation. The figure also shows that an implemen-
tation of IDEA was introduced in the new 0.9.8d version, though not performing best
overall as in the Cryptix implementation.
3.2.2.2 Asymmetric cryptography
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the signing and verification processes respectively (see
Section 3.1.4) of the supported OpenSSL asymmetric algorithms.
Figure 3.7 shows that for the message signing process both algorithms suffered
a slight performance decrease in the newer 0.9.8d implementation. DSA performs
consistently better than RSA for message signing as key size increases from 512 to
2048, performing almost 20%, more than a 100% and almost 300% better. RSA
is however still often chosen over DSA as it can be used in conjunction with any
hashing algorithm and can also additionally be used to encrypt messages. These
figures additionally affirm the results in Figure 3.4 where DSA-1024 outperformed
RSA-1024 during the signing process for the standard JCE libraries.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of OpenSSL asymmetric signing algorithms
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of OpenSSL asymmetric verification algorithms
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The verification algorithms in Figure 3.8 show a slight performance decrease for
both asymmetric algorithms in the newer 0.9.8d implementation. As is generally
accepted, RSA performs consistently better than DSA during message verification.
3.2.2.3 Hashing
Supported OpenSSL hashing algorithms are shown in Figure 3.9:
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of OpenSSL hash algorithms
The figure shows mixed performance results for hashing algorithms in the new
version. 0.9.7f shows performance improvements from MD2 through to MD5 but the
new version shows MD4 performing better than MD5.
Looking at the Cryptix implementations in the previous chapter (Figure 3.5) we
can see that SHA-1 outperforms the other algorithms by a large margin. In the
OpenSSL implementation however it performs worse than MD4 and MD5.
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3.2.2.4 Summary
This section compared and contrasted two implementations of the OpenSSL cryp-
tographic library with each other as well as with client side Java libraries discussed
in the previous section. We have shown that even amongst minor software version
alterations performance can vary considerably. In particular we have shown that
when choosing a hashing algorithm the software implementation significantly impacts
the performance amongst the MD algorithm family. OpenSSL’s SHA-1 and IDEA
implementations also perform poorly compared to the other OpenSSL algorithms.
Implementations of these algorithms are however significantly faster than their peers
in the Java Cryptix implementation. When considering the symmetric encryption
algorithms, the newer OpenSSL 0.9.8d implementation provides a particularly fast
version of the cryptographically strong AES-128 algorithm.
3.2.3 Web Services - Hybrid security system
In this section we consider the combination of cryptographic algorithms used in
VeriSign’s web service Trusted Services Integration Kit (TSIK) [87], currently part of
the Apache Software Foundation [96], and evaluate them based on the level of security
they provide as well as their performance. TSIK’s performance is evaluated through
direct comparison with Java’s Cryptography Extensions (JCE). This is published in
[90, 89].
We first analyse the level of security provided by the implementation of the hybrid
system discussed in Section 3.1.4 and then evaluate its relative performance overhead
through experimentation.
We found that TSIK typically has worse performance than JCE. Its performance
is similar to JCE, except that it slows down when processing messages with large
plaintext sizes. It also provides adequate confidentiality, non-repudiation and sender
authentication guarantees through the use of Triple DES and RSA, though should
consider using SHA-256 for message verification in future releases as suggested in
recent literature [94]. With respect to technical ability, TSIK appears to be a viable
and competitive alternative in securing web based business interactions.
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3.2.3.1 Software analysis
Java keytool, Java’s key and certificate management tool, is used to create the Java
keystore, with appropriate key pairs, used by TSIK and JCE. The keytool generates
key pairs for RSA where N is user specified (512, 1024 or 2048), d is the same length
as N and e defaults to 216 + 1 (i.e. 17 bits long). As stated in Section 3.1.4, these
values are adequate and it is currently recommended that the user selects the modulus
to be at least 1024 bits.
TSIK 1.10 provides additional functionality, above that of the Java Cryptography
Extensions (JCE), to construct valid XML messages after encryption/decryption or
signing/verifying. These messages conform to the W3C XML Signature and Encryp-
tion specifications [97]. TSIK supports Triple DES (in cipher block chaining mode)
for symmetric encryption, as defined by W3C [97]. Using a key length of at least 112
bits will currently provide sufficient security. Triple DES is however relatively slow
compared to other more recent contenders such as AES [98]. Conversely, it has stood
the test of time and so is potentially a more reliable solution.
Only SHA-1 is provided for message digest generation (digest length of 160 bits).
SHA-1 has very recently been shown to be less secure than predicted and it is recom-
mended that SHA-256 or better should be used [94]. RSAES-PKCS1-v1 5 algorithm,
specified by W3C [97] and RFC2437 [99], is used as the RSA standard. As stated
in Section 3.1.4, if backward compatibility is not an issue Optimal Asymmetric En-
cryption Padding (OAEP) should be used in preference to PKCS1-v1 5. However,
PKCS1-v1 5 provides adequate security assuming the programmer is aware of certain
issues. Also, RFC2437 [99] indicates that RSACRT is used.
JCE does not support the creation of valid XML messages but supports various
symmetric key algorithms including AES, Triple DES and RC5. It also supports
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 and MD5, amongst others, for message digest generation.
It also specifies that the padding is applied according to RFC3447 [76]. RSA-CRT is
also used.
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3.2.3.2 Performance analysis
The following section details a comparative evaluation of the performance of VeriSign’s
TSIK toolkit and the standard Java Cryptography Extensions (JCE) in order to iden-
tify whether TSIK is a viable tool to secure web services, for instance those used in
performance critical online transactions.
Environment
All experiments were run on a 3GHz Intel Pentium 4 with 1GB RAM, running
Java(TM) 2 Runtime Environment, Standard Edition (build 1.4.2-b28) on top of
Linux Fedora Core 2. We used The Legion of the Bouncy Castle [100] as the Java
RSA provider for both JCE and TSIK, and used Apache Axis 1.2 to generate the
appropriate WSDL interface for the web service, which was hosted on Tomcat 5.
Axis was used to both generate the appropriate SOAP messages, from the Java
code and TSIK XML documents, to be sent to the web service, on the server side,
and to generate the SOAP messages which are sent back from the web service to
the client. We took performance measurements on the client as well as server side.
Message transmission and conversion delays were not measured.
Experiments
In comparing the performance of TSIK and JCE we first consider message con-
fidentiality, namely encrypting the message using 3DES and encrypting the 3DES
key using RSA. Secondly we consider message integrity and authentication by eval-
uating the cost of signing and verifying messages using SHA-1 and RSA. Lastly we
study non-repudiation and evaluate its cost as a function of key length. The three
experiments are detailed below.
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Experiment 1:
In experiment 1 we analyse the performance of Triple DES, as a function of message
size:
• Client side: Message plaintext encrypted using Triple DES with a key size of
168. Symmetric key encrypted using an RSA public key (modulus 1024)
• Server side: Encrypted symmetric key decrypted using RSA private key (bit
length 1024) and cipher text then decrypted.
Experiment 2:
In experiment 2 we analyse the combined performance of SHA-1 and RSA algo-
rithms, as a function of the message size:
• Client side: Message signed using SHA-1 and RSA private key (bit length 1024)
• Server side: Message verified using SHA- 1 and RSA public key
Experiment 3:
In experiment 3 we analyse how the modulus size affects the performance of RSA
during signature creation and verification:
• Client side: Message signed (as in experiment 2) using RSA key sizes 512, 1024
and 2048.
• Server side: Message verified.
Results
The experiments above were conducted for TSIK as well as JCE. We repeated the
first two experiments for messages with a range of plaintext sizes, namely 2, 4, 8,
16, . . . , 512 and 1024 KB. Experiment 3 was done using a 2 KB plaintext size. The
results are shown in the figures below. It should be noted that all points in Figures
3.10 and 3.12 exhibit 90% confidence intervals of 3 milliseconds or less and points in
Figures 3.11 and 3.13 exhibit confidence intervals of 0.1 milliseconds or less.
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Figure 3.10: Triple DES encryption time
Experiment 1:
Figure 3.10 shows that JCE performs noticeably better for large file sizes. It also
shows that Triple DES encryption takes longer than decryption in both cases (TSIK
and JCE) except for very large messages where decryption takes longer when using
TSIK. We have no precise explanation for this and can only suggest it has to do with
the particulars of the implementation.
For RSA we see the opposite effect. Figure 3.11 indicates that RSA encryption
takes less time than decryption. As explained in Section 3.1.4.1, that is caused by
the size of the keys used in encryption and decryption. For encryption, the public
key is used, which has a small public exponent of 17 bits. For decryption the large
private key is used whose exponent is the same length as the modulus (i.e 1024
bits). When comparing TSIK with JCE, we see that the differences are minimal.
Decryption varies by an average of about 1 millisecond between the implementations
and encryption even less. We also observe that the cost of encrypting or decrypting
the Triple DES key with RSA in Figure 3.11 is relatively small compared to the overall
cost of encrypting/decrypting the message in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.11: RSA-1024 encryption time of 168 bit Triple DES key
Experiment 2:
Figure 3.12 shows that as message size increases signing consistently takes more
time than verification for both JCE and TSIK. This is once again expected as the
messages are signed using the large 1024 bit RSA private key. Encrypting the message
digest should take constant time for each file size and so the graph pattern should
be wholly due to SHA-1 hashing. Whereas signing and verification time increase
steadily for JCE, TSIK performs markedly worse for large file sizes. TSIK should also
consider using the more secure SHA-256 for message verification in future releases as
is discussed in Section 3.2.3.1. We also see a 20ms fixed difference in overhead for
TSIK. This is likely due to the cost of converting the message into an XML readable
format.
Experiment 3:
Figure 3.13 shows that doubling the RSA key size causes signing time to increase
whilst having little effect on the verification time. This can be explained by the fact
that doubling the key size effectively doubles the length of the private exponent (used
in signing) whilst keeping the public exponent length constant.
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Figure 3.13: Message signing/verifying (2KB message size)
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3.2.4 Summary
This chapter evaluated implementations of the cryptographic algorithms used to
achieve message confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication. It has
consistently been found that the implementation has a significant impact on the ex-
pected performance of each algorithm.
We first considered two client side Java implementations, namely standard Java
JCE libraries and Cryptix libraries, and found that the standard JCE libraries per-
formed markedly worse. 3DES performed 25% worse than DES for Cryptix and only
marginally worse for JCE. The expected performance degradation of 3DES is 50%, in-
dicating that the implementation played a significant part in algorithm performance.
IDEA was shown to be the fastest symmetric algorithm.
Secondly, two server side OpenSSL implementations were considered. AES-128
performed particularly well for the newer OpenSSL 0.9.8d version even outperforming
IDEA. The MD protocol family showed performance increases from MD2 through to
MD5 for OpenSSL 0.9.7.f and Cryptix, whereas the 0.9.8.d implementation peaked
at MD4. This further emphasises the fact that the implementation choice influences
the algorithm performance significantly.
Lastly we evaluated Verisign’s TSIK toolkit for trusted Web Service interactions,
comparing it to Java’s standard JCE library. TSIK has comparable performance but
suffers when signing/verifying larger files. It is likely that his can be remedied by a
more careful implementation. Further improvements such as using the secure SHA-
256 hashing or opting for faster symmetric encryption algorithms is also advisable
[94].
Having taken a closer look at the performance and security of the algorithms
used to secure client-server interactions we now turn to the security protocols which
facilitate the interaction in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Adaptive Security
Using the security algorithms analysed in the previous chapter as well as adaptive
security principles discussed in Chapter 2 we now focus on the creation of an adaptive
security solution. We first present a method to augment existing security services
with adaptive features, outlining key steps and activities for such a process. The
method itself is designed to achieve an adaptive security solution that adheres to
the feedback loop mechanism put forward in IBM’s Autonomic Computing model
[63]. We furthermore put forward a generic design for an adaptive security service,
detailing core interactions amongst key components. The methodology and design
forms the basis for our Adaptive Security solution in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 Methodology
In this section we provide a methodology to achieve and adaptive security solution
that conforms to IBM’s Autonomic Computing vision. Extending a Security Service
to facilitate security adaptation requires a number steps and considerations.
In addressing the scope of such a methodology we note that it in particular achieves
adaptation for existing security systems. Much has been done in the pursuit of achiev-
ing runtime adaptation for new systems built from the ground up. Such solutions are
typically platform specific (e.g. Dynamic TAO, Open ORB, etc.), limiting their scope
to adaptive security systems on those platforms, or language specific (e.g. Open Java,
R-Java, PCL, etc) limiting its use to security systems of those languages. The exten-
sion of existing security systems with adaptive features is addressed in our method-
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ology.
In the context of existing security systems, our methodology addresses a certain
subset of systems that can be considered for adaptation. Firstly it applies to sys-
tems where the cross-cutting concern is measurable property of the environment. We
advocate a measurement approach where the relationship between security and the
cross-cutting concern is studied offline through experimentation. The challenge lies in
identifying a measurable property of the environment to represent the cross-cutting
concern, assuming this is possible. For example, when measuring the environment for
security threats before adapting firewall security policies one must first decide what
should be measured to accurately represent a threat. Furthermore, this measurement
must also be made at runtime, as is also the case for other runtime adaptive systems,
for comparison with the offline data. It is therefore imperative that the performance
cost of such monitoring should is not prohibitive to the adaptation process or the
expected system functionality.
When considering the security adaptation itself we note that our methodology
applies to systems where the security adaptation has an impact on the chosen cross-
cutting concern. In other words, as detailed in Section 2.2.1, the impact of the
adaptation on the security system serves as feedback to the Monitor component in
the next feedback loop cycle. As such their relationship can be studied and automated
security actions taken at runtime.
Lastly, a key consideration when applying the methodology to achieve runtime
security adaptation, is how to successfully leverage control from the existing system.
The pertinent part of the existing system is the decision process relating to what
security mechanism to utilize and when to apply it. This is a key challenge and can
range from trivially simple if the security system is built with or on top of adaptive
technologies or prohibitively difficult for closed source legacy systems. A number of
techniques on how this may be achieved is discussed in Chapter 2.1.2
Methodology
1. Establish a control point in the existing system where a security adaptation can
be induced. Effectively leveraging control is system specific and can be done in
53
a number of ways including providing wrappers (i.e. encapsulation) for existing
system components or utilising any number of other techniques detailed in our
background chapter, Section 2.1.3.
2. Identify a cross-cutting concern against which security will be traded off. Such a
concern must be a measurable property of the environment or context in which
the system operates. It should be measurable at runtime and monitored without
adversely affecting functional or non-functional system properties.
3. Study the interrelationship between security and the cross-cutting concern in
the existing system context. In particular identify measurable factors which
most significantly influence their relationship. Assess such factors off-line trough
experimentation building an accurate and relevant representation of the rela-
tionship, and therefore the system, based on such factors. Such data may at this
stage be system or implementation specific. Trends based on the factors in the
relationship can therefore be transposed to a model of the system which should
then be further verified as to its accuracy.
4. Formulate a trade-off goal based on the desired security characteristics as well as
cross-cutting concern considerations. Evaluating security is a complex and error
prone process and is detailed in Section 1.2. Create an appropriate policy with
steps based on the system representation or model to achieve the desired goal.
4.2 Design
Having specified the steps required to extend a security service with adaptive features
we now detail a design of such a newly adaptive system to support the methodology
process. We also provide a more detailed design of one particular design component,
namely the Adaptation Unit, since this will be needed in the next chapter where we
apply the principles in this chapter to the design and implementation of an adaptive
Cryptographic Service. The security service in the design can represent any of the
security types discussed in the previous chapter. In keeping with our methodology
we present the following design:
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Figure 4.1: Security Service
Figure 4.1 depicts a standard security service. The Security Unit takes source data
as input, applies the relevant security function to the data and returns the trans-
formed data. The data transformation may be symmetric cryptography, asymmetric
cryptography or hashing.
Figure 4.2: Adaptive Security Service
Extending such a service with adaptive features requires a number of key compo-
nents and interactions. Figure 4.2 depicts the components of an adaptive security
service which augments a standard security service with adaptive features. Further-
more, the design is a realisation of the adaptive feedback loop in Chapter 2.
The Adaptation Unit serves as a key component in the design. It is akin to the
Executor service in the feedback loop and is responsible for enforcing the security
adaptation. Firstly it is required to intercept the Source Data in transit to the Se-
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curity Unit, forming a control point where security can be adapted. Furthermore, it
maps the given Policy rules to the Source Data indicating to the Security Unit which
Security function to apply to which sets of Data.
The Monitor Unit enables the Adaptive Security Service to observe and report
on a cross-cutting concern in the service environment. It corresponds to the Monitor
component in the feedback loop. Through runtime monitoring of the system context it
enables the Trade-Off Engine to make informed decisions based on the Current State
of the system.
The Trade-Off Engine component serves as the decision point for the next two
components of the feedback loop. Firstly it represents the Analyse component; The
Service States file contains pre-computed data or a system model which represents
the interrelationship between security and the cross-cutting environmental concern.
Taking the Current State into account the Trade-Off Engine is thus able to determine
the future system state, i.e. the change in the relationship, if security is adapted. The
last component is the Plan component and determines if and how security should be
adapted based on the adaptation Goal. With reference to the Service States the
Trade-Off Engine generates a Policy which satisfies the adaptation Goal.
Adaption Unit Design
In this section we explore the Adaptation Unit further in support of our adaptive
Cryptographic Service design in Section 5.2.
The Adaptation Unit is instrumental in the adaptation process in two key areas.
Firstly it is tasked to intercept data destined for the Security Service thus leveraging
control over which security transformations may be applied to this data in future.
Additionally, with the aid of a given set of policy specifications, it instructs the
Security Service on which security functions are appropriate for which sets of data.
Figure 4.3 depicts the primary interfaces to such a component (Also see Figure 4.2
for the Adaptation Unit in context of the adaptive security service).
In aid of creating an appropriate design for a Cryptographic Service’s Execute
component in the next chapter (Section 5.2) we now further define the structure of
the generic Adaptation Unit. Such a design can be seen in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Adaptation Unit
Figure 4.4: Adaptation Unit Components
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The leftmost component called the Interceptor diverts data destined for the Secu-
rity Unit to the Adaptation Engine. Data may be parsed and presented in a format
specified by the Adaptation Engine interface.
The Policy Interpreter parses the incoming policy updates, generating appropri-
ately formatted Security Function & Data Filter pairs as input to the Adaptation
Engine. Such parsing may include, but is not limited to, authenticating the sender,
policy syntax checking and mapping policy rules to internal security algorithm & data
filter representations.
Lastly theAdaptation Engine applies the filter conditions specified in theData Filter
to the incoming data from the Interceptor. Once filtered, the Data is sent to the Se-
curity Unit specifying the appropriate Security Function to apply to the particular
subset of data.
4.3 Summary
In this Chapter we introduced a methodology to successfully create an Adaptive
Security Service. To that end we also presented a design to facilitate the creation of
such a service which adheres to the adaptive systems feedback loop design.
In the next chapter we explore the design and creation of an Adaptation Unit
for a particular service environment (i.e. Web server with SSL/TLS cryptographic
security). In the chapter thereafter we delve deeper into the other stages of the feed-
back loop, exploring the interrelationship between security and performance through
experimentation and finally demonstrating the effectiveness of such a trade-off at
runtime.
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Chapter 5
Adaptive Security for SSL
In this chapter the first step of the methodology in Section 4.1 is applied to create
a control point through which a security adaptation can be applied to an existing
Cryptographic security service. In particular, we focus on the realising an Adaptation
Unit for the SSL cryptographic protocol in a web server context by applying our design
in Section 4.2 which supports our methodology. The solution augments cryptographic
security measures between clients and a web server with adaptive features to respond
to various runtime security influences in a timely and effective manner.
We first introduce the SSL protocol, which utilises many of the cryptographic
algorithms analysed in Chapter 3 to secure communications between a client and
server. We then realise our Adaptive SSL (ASSL) solution through a design and
implementation which reflects the Adaptation Unit design in Section 4.2. Finally
we evaluate its performance to ascertain its viability as an effective adaptive SSL
solution.
5.1 SSL
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), also referred to as Transport Layer Security (TLS), is a
protocol used to secure communications between an application or web server and a
client over the Internet. The protocol is standardised through the Transport Layer
Security [69] effort and involves establishing a secure transport layer connection be-
tween a client and server through a handshake mechanism. Security is provided in
the form of authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of messages.
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During the handshake, algorithms are selected for the aforementioned security prop-
erties, based on those available to both the client and the server. This handshake
process is commonly known as SSL negotiation and the resulting secured connection
is called a session. Established SSL sessions can also be renegotiated at the discretion
of the client or server.
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SSL Alert
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SSL
Handshake
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HTTP
SSL Record Protocol
TCP
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Applications
Figure 5.1: SSL Protocol Stack [3]
5.1.1 Protocol
The SSL protocol is comprised of a number of protocols and protocol layers which
facilitate the establishment of a SSL session between a client and a server. The server
can be any application, such as a web server. In this section we look at how the
different protocols compliment each other to provide this secure SSL service [3, 69].
Figure 5.1 shows the SSL protocols in relation to the other internet protocols. The
SSL Record Protocol provides security in the form of confidentiality and message
integrity to the layers above. Of particular interest is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) which operates on top of the SSL Record Layer to provide secure Web based
interactions. Three further protocols are specified as part of SSL. The SSL Handshake,
SSL Change Cipher Spec and SSL Alert protocols are defined at a higher level to
support management of the SSL secured sessions. We discuss these protocols in more
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detail below.
5.1.1.1 SSL Record Protocol
The SSL Record Protocol provides a secure client-server connection for higher layer
protocols. It ensures data confidentiality through symmetric encryption and mes-
sage integrity through hashing. Messages from the layer above are first fragmented
into blocks, then optionally compressed, a hash value added, then encrypted (adding
padding as necessary) and finally sent. Upon receiving the data the process is re-
versed. Data is decrypted, verified, optionally decompressed, reassembled and passed
to the higher layers.
5.1.1.2 SSL handshaking protocols
The following three subprotocols facilitate negotiation of security parameters used
by the SSL Record Protocol, instantiating negotiated security parameters, optional
mutual authentication and reporting on error conditions. They work together to
establish a secure session between the client and server.
Handshake Protocol
The handshake protocol plays a key part in the SSL protocol and is responsible for
negotiating the security parameters used by the SSL Record Protocol to secure the
session. During parameter establishment the two parties may also authenticate each
other and the session may also be renegotiated. A breakdown of the required client-
server interactions can be seen in Figure 5.2. The protocol can be separated into four
logical phases as indicated by the dotted lines. In phase one the client and server
determine the encryption, authentication and compression algorithms to be used.
In phases two and three the server and client respectively may be authenticated if
required by the other party. Lastly the negotiated algorithms are activated and used
to finish the negotiation process in phase four. Protocol details below are provided for
completeness and are not strictly necessary to understand our research contribution.
SSL terms are indicated in italics and optional messages are shaded in Figure 5.2.
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The client initiates the first phase of the negotiation with a client hello message.
The client hallo message contains a CipherSuite list, in preferential order, of all sup-
ported algorithms for the main cryptographic techniques. It also contains a random
structure, lists the supported compression methods and provides the current SSL ver-
sion number. Lastly it provides a SessionID to identify the session. Upon receiving
the message the server selects a CipherSuite and compression method from the re-
spective lists and replies to the client with a server hello message. In addition to the
preferred CipherSuite and compression algorithm selected from the lists it also con-
tains a SSL version number, a newly generated random structure and a SessionID. If
the returned SessionID is the same as that received from the client it implies that the
server found the SessionID in the server session cache and the old session with that
ID will be resumed (Protocol continues from phase four if this is the case). Otherwise
the new SessionID returned becomes the current SessionID.
In phase two, if requested by the client, the server will respond with a mes-
sage to allow the client to authenticate the server. Optional messages are shaded
in Figure 5.2. The certificate message contains the server certificate (in a format
specified by the CipherSuite) and a list of any additional required certificates. An
additional server key exchange massage may also be sent depending on the authen-
tication method (Further details are extraneous and not covered here). Once the
server is authenticated it may request, through the certificate request message, the
client authenticate itself also. Finally the server sends a compulsory server hello done
message to end the server hello message sequence.
If requested by the server, the client must send its own certificate message. The
client must thereafter send a client key exchange message containing relevant key
information which depends on the previously selected asymmetric protocol. If a
certificate was sent the client sends a certificate verify message which provides explicit
verification that the client owns the certificate. This is done through sending a signed
(using the client private key and hash function) version of the previous messages to
the server.
Phase four is the final phase of the handshake protocol and completes the client-
server session setup. For the first message the Change Cipher Spec Protocol (see
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below) is invoked to activate the negotiated security parameters for all subsequent
messages and notify the server thereof through a change cipher spec message. Lastly
the client sends a finished message which is the first message exchanged with the
new negotiated SSL session. The server similarly invokes the Change Cipher Spec
Protocol and sends its own finished message.
From this point on the application layer can start sending messages using the newly
negotiated SSL session.
Once all four phases have been completed either the server or client can ask for
the session to be renegotiated by sending a hello request or client hello message re-
spectively. This will initiate the SSL negotiation protocol but since the client and
server have already authenticated each other and exchanged the necessary keys, the
protocol completes phase one and continues from phase four where the newly agreed
on CipherSuite and compression algorithm can be activated. The role this feature
plays in our Adaptive SSL solution is discussed later in this chapter.
Change Cipher Spec Protocol
The Change Cipher Spec Protocol is responsible for changing the pending Cipher
Spec state (the parameters negotiated during the handshake) to the active Cipher
Spec state (the parameters used to secure the session). In Figure 5.2 the client
sends a change cipher spec message using the pending Cipher Spec and immediately
notifies the client SSL Record Layer to make the pending Cipher Spec state the active
Cipher Spec state. Once both client and server have invoked the Change Cipher Spec
Protocol they will be able to send and receive messages using the newly active Cipher
Spec state.
Alert Protocol
The alert protocol is used to communicate a variety of fatal or warning messages
to the other party. Messages include closure alert messages such as the close notify
message to signify that the sender will not send anymore messages and close the
connection. There are also a variety of error alerts that are used during and after
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the negotiation phase. Such message include handshake failure, certificate expired,
decryption failed, internal error, etc. See RFC4346 [69] for full listing.
5.2 Adaptive SSL
The Adaptation Unit is a key component in providing Adaptive Security for our
chosen Cryptographical Service, namely SSL. In this section we explore the design,
implementation and performance evaluation of such a component which we henceforth
refer to as Adaptive SSL (ASSL).
We first detail our ASSL design, followed by the implementation and finally an
overhead evaluation to ascertain its suitability for runtime security adaptation.
5.2.1 Design
This section explores the design of an ASSL Adaptation Unit in a web server con-
text. We chose to design ASSL for the Apache web server environment. Apache is a
popular web server used in industry today. As such our ASSL solution spans the gap
from research to industry making it a practical tool for runtime security adaptation.
Apache is also an open source web server platform and so allows greater flexibility in
how we can implement our design.
Our ASSL design facilitates runtime security changes to SSL secured sessions in
response to cross-cutting environmental concerns. We first evaluate current meth-
ods of changing security and present a better alternative as a further motivation for
our design. Next we detail the design showing how ASSL can change runtime secu-
rity based on a variety of environmental concerns. Finally the design is show to be
consistent with the generic Adaptation Unit design in Section 4.2.
Design motivation
Web server security is typically configured before the server is started. It is however
possible to change the security at runtime using distributed configuration files. These
configuration files are distributed throughout the server file system and provide the
configuration directives for the directories and subdirectories they reside in. The
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configuration files can contain directives for any server aspect including security and
can be changed by anyone who has write access to the file. These files are therefore
ideally suited to scenarios where users need to configure their part of the server
but do not have access to the main server configuration file. A typical example is
where Internet Service Providers (ISP) host multiple user sites and want to give users
permission to configure their own sites.
Clearly this is a far cry from our envisioned Adaptive SSL solution where security
adaptation is automated and can react in response to a variety of environmental con-
cerns such as threat levels or performance considerations. Distributed configuration
files are however also not suitable as a basic building block for our ASSL solution.
Firstly, these files allow configuration directives other than those related to security
and so permitting their use might result in unexpected changes to the server config-
uration by web site owners.
Secondly, allowing their use incurs an additional performance cost for the server.
For example, if a client requests the file index.html in directory /www/htdocs/example
the presence of the following configuration files have to be checked:
• /configuration
• /www/configuration
• /www/htdocs/configuration
• /www/htdocs/example/configuration
Additionally if any are found their configuration directives are read and merged,
according to a rule set, into a single configuration file. This process is repeated for
every client request regardless of whether the configuration files have changed.
The directory accessed determines the security directives that are applied. Config-
urations may additionally specify a filter on file types to which the security directives
will apply. Adapting security only on the directory and file type accessed is clearly
quite restrictive and we may wish to adapt security based on connection- or client
information.
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Requirements
In a design of an Adaptive SSL solution we would therefore endeavor to provide a
certain set of key features in addition to meeting the Adaptation Unit design require-
ments detailed in Section 4.2. Firstly we need to sperate the concern of security from
that of server configuration. Decoupling the security rules in this way from the main
server configuration allows us to build a more powerful and flexible adaptive secu-
rity model since the security rules can be determined, deployed and changed without
restriction, independently and parallel to the web server and its components.
Secondly, the design must facilitate the identification of clients requiring security
adaptation using an extensive set of filter conditions. This will allow for more expres-
sive security rules and facilitate a closer match between the environmental conditions
being monitored and the actual clients that need a security change. For example if
security threats are monitored, clients requiring additional security could be identi-
fied by their IP address. Identifying clients based on a subset of connection- or client
information rather than the limited file location and type would achieve this.
Finally Adaptive SSL’s design must accommodate security adaptation based on a
wide range of cross-cutting concerns. Such concerns should not be stipulated by ASSL
and so place no restrictions on the intended use of ASSL. Concerns may be monitored
by specialised 3rd parties thus removing the logic that guides the adaptation from the
main server. “As a separate entity, the effectiveness of the adaptation logic is more
analysable and the mechanism more modifiable and extendable”[27]. Specialised 3rd
parties could include firewalls which adapt security based on current threat levels. For
example, clients that use typically insecure wireless internet connections at airports
can be provided with a higher level of security if the 3rd party detects that the client
is using the server from the airport or if the airport firewall detects a security threat.
Others could include system performance monitors which maximise the security based
on current resource availability, system administrators who need to respond to a
threat quickly or data monitors which alter the connection security based on the
security requirements of the data transferred. We further explore one of these, namely
adapting security based on current system performance, in the next chapter. ASSL
adaptation should also be controlled through a standard interface allowing 3rd parties
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to design their components in a “Commercial-off-the-shelf” (COTS) fashion for later
integration with the system.
Designing ASSL in this way adheres to many concepts discussed in Chapter 2 and
allows it to form a vital part of the self-adaptation feedback loop by providing the
execution component of such a loop.
ASSL design
Applying key ideas and concepts in the previous section, we present our Adaptive
SSL design in the context of a web server environment.
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Figure 5.3: SSL (enc = encrypted; req = request; resp = response; conf = configuration)
Figure 5.3 depicts a standard web server request-response processing cycle during
a typical SSL secured session. The numbers in the figures indicate the event order
and the labels the interaction type. Events with the same number indicate a decision
point and only one of the events take place. Figure 5.3 shows the client sending an
encrypted request to the server in step 1. The request is initially passed to SSL which
then queries the web server’s configuration file (where the security rules are stored)
in step 2. In step 3 SSL either decides to adapt the security by renegotiating the
SSL session or passes the request to the content generator. Depending on the request
the content generator may either reply with a created file or provide a static file as
68
a response in step 4. Lastly, the file is encrypted by SSL and passed securely to the
client.
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Figure 5.4: Adaptive SSL
Figure 5.4 shows how ASSL is incorporated into the web server environment. It
effectively takes over security adaptation, namely the SSL negotiation and renego-
tiation logic, by intercepting requests and evaluating them against the negotiation
rules specified by 3rd parties. ASSL intercepts the client request in step 1 and either
renegotiates security for the SSL session or passes the request to SSL in step 2. Input
from 3rd parties are not numbered in the figure as they are allowed to send requests
to change the negotiation rules at any time. This has far reaching implications as it
allows security to be tightly coupled with runtime environmental monitoring and so
allows the security to change as the environment or security requirements change.
Figure 5.5 is a magnified version of the ASSL module in Figure 5.4. It shows how
ASSL adapts the session security, during the request-response cycle in Figure 5.4,
based on renegotiation rules specified in the Request Filter. As can be seen in step 2,
the request filter allows security updates from 3rd parties and client queries to run in
parallel. 3rd parties are therefore able to identify clients, or sets of clients, at runtime
in a flexible and effective manner. Request Filter security conditions could include
client security level, type of client, client location, client name, etc. See next chapter
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for details of the chosen Request Filter implementation.
Design evaluation
This section showed how ASSL can provide a runtime adaptive security solution
for SSL in a web server context. We now evaluate the domain specific design above
with respect to its adherence to the generic Adaptation Unit design, as detailed in
Section 4.2, as well as showing that our design additionally meets the requirements
stipulated earlier in this chapter.
Firstly it conforms to the Adaptation Unit design. As seen in Step 1 Figure 5.4
intercepting client requests destined for the SSL component fulfills its role as In-
terceptor. ASSL furthermore supports incoming policy updates through a 3rd party
interface as seen in Figure 5.5. This functionality is akin to that of the Policy In-
terpreter, accepting and parsing the incoming policy updates. Lastly, ASSL applies
the policy updates stored in the request filter to data associated with a particular
client. Such filtering and the associated application of a particular cryptographic al-
gorithm to the data adheres to the functional requirements of the Adaptation Engine
component.
The ASSL design furthermore adheres to a number of additional requirements de-
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tailed in this chapter. Firstly it separates the concern of security from that of server
configuration by supporting SSL security configuration through the ASSL request
filter. Security configuration have thus moved from a webserver centric SSL config-
uration to one that is configured and maintained by the ASSL component. ASSL is
also required to support the identification of clients through a set of extensive filter
conditions. It does this through the Request Filter shown in Figure 5.5. Request Fil-
ter particulars are detailed for our chosen implementation in the next section. Lastly
the ASSL design accommodates security adaptation based on a wide range of cross-
cutting concerns through the HTTP interface which is exposed to COTS based 3rd
parties. Any cross-cutting concern can be monitored and reacted on (i.e. updating
ASSL security) by these specialised 3rd parties.
5.2.2 Implementation
In this section we present and evaluate key features of the ASSL Apache based im-
plementation.
The Apache [96] web server is built on a modular design where nearly all of its
functionality is provided through modules. Modules may register an interest to ma-
nipulate a client’s request at various points during the request-response processing
cycle. Apache provides various hooks to facilitate this. Apache is configured using
directives which are read from a file at start-up (httpd.conf) or at runtime through
the distributed .htaccess configuration files which are stored in the particular direc-
tories accessed during a client request. Modules may also have their own directives
which can be included in these files. Htaccess files are however not ideally suited to
automated runtime configuration as discussed in Section 5.2.1.
SSL is one such Apache module which integrates the OpenSSL toolkit [86] into
Apache. SSL session security is configured through the SSLCipherSuite directive.
This directive specifies a subset of security algorithms that can be used to establish
a secure session with the client. A directive to include all algorithms in order of
strength would look as follows: ALL:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW:+EXP:+NULL. This is a
custom syntax particular to OpenSSL. See Appendix B for a full description.
Adaptive SSL is also implemented as an Apache module and can be installed on
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existing Apache installations as it requires no additional Apache or SSL source code
changes. The significant parts are detailed below:
Request Filter: The request filter seen in Figure 5.5 is a sequence of [condition,
SSLCipherSuite] pairs on which the security of a session with the client will be rene-
gotiated if one of the conditions matches the client request and the current session
security is not a subset of the newly selected SSLCipherSuite. Each condition in the
list is checked in turn and the first that matches is selected, much in the same way
as firewall filters. Conditions are formulated using the powerful SSLRequire directive
(see Appendix A). Each condition is an arbitrarily complex boolean expression which
can make use of standard CGI, Apache and SSL related variables. For example; A
condition for the cipher suite DES-CBC-SHA (DES encryption in CBC mode using the
SHA hashing algorithm) could be stated as follows [101]:
(%{SSL_CIPHER} !~ m/^(EXP|NULL)/
and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O} eq "Snake Oil, Ltd."
and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"}
and %{TIME_WDAY} >= 1 and %{TIME_WDAY} <= 5
and %{TIME_HOUR} >= 8 and %{TIME_HOUR} <= 18)
or %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192\.76\.162\.[0-9]+$/
The above condition states that SSL requests with ciphers which are not of type
EXPORT or NULL, from the organisation ‘‘Snake Oil, Ltd.’’ who are also from the
organisational units Staff, CA or Dev and who makes requests Monday to Friday
between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. or any request which comes from the address 192.76.162
will need to be renegotiated according the SSLCipherSuite in the [condition, SSLCi-
pherSuite] pair. In this example it is DES-CBC-SHA. See Appendix A for the full list
of variables that can be used in a SSLRequire directive.
The SSLRequire directives are expressed using an extensive subset of contextual
information at the right level of abstraction. It uses only contextual information
relating to the end-to-end client-server connection (which is the primary concern of
SSL), nothing higher (application context) and nothing lower (data context). This
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separation of concerns allows the module to be used in a variety of application and
data contexts without any unnecessary or artificial restrictions at those levels of ab-
straction.
3rd Party interface ASSL also registers a handler, which manages all 3rd party
requests to Apache to insert condition pairs in the Request Filter. This provides a
platform independent and secure means (allowing 3rd party verification) by which the
security can be changed as all 3rd party requests are made over HTTP. A request to
change the security is a delimited URL specifying the location in the Request Filter
to insert the condition pair, the SSLRequire condition and lastly the SSLCipherSuite
to apply if the SSLRequire condition matches the request. In the example below the
request is made to the server at domain.com and adapt-ssl indicates that the request
must be processed by the ASSL handler. This is followed by Request Filter location
(i.e. 1) where the condition pair will be inserted. The [SSLRequire, SSLCipher-
Suite] condition pair is an example of reducing server security to no more than 56 bit
encryption. It states that all clients using key sizes greater than 56 bits should rene-
gotiate their security to use DES encryption (i.e. 56 bit encryption) and SHA hashing.
http://domain.com/adapt-ssl?"1?%{SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE} > 56?DES-CBC-SHA"
The handler provides a thread safe means to alter the Request Filter and so facil-
itate runtime security adaptation based on runtime configurable conditions. It also
alleviates the burden on the web server to manage session security and allows spe-
cialised programs and individuals who can more effectively monitor environmental
factors, such as potential threats and system load, to alter the security. Such parties
could include firewalls, system performance monitors, network monitors and system
administrators. Resolving conflicts of concern between the various parties are not
within the scope of this thesis.
Hooks: ASSL registers a number of hooks with Apache in such a way that
they are interleaved with existing SSL hooks, in essence taking control of the SSL
renegotiation functionality without altering the existing SSL implementation.
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Configuration. SSL’s SSLCipherSuite directive is stored in the event that it
needs to be applied, when appropriate, if the Request Filter (see above) is empty or
none of the conditions in the Request Filter match the client request. Thus logically
reverting back to the state where SSL has control over session renegotiations.
5.2.2.1 Discussion
This section evaluates our Adaptive SSL implementation choices. We identify key
strengths and limitations of our ASSL module.
Firstly, ASSL can be deployed on any SSL enabled Apache server requiring no
changes to the server code. Only a server restart is required rather than a reinstall, as
is required by some other modules, and so minimising barriers for ASSL deployment.
The ASSL module makes no changes to the existing Apache SSL implementation
(i.e. mod ssl [102]) and so need not be re-released when Apache SSL changes. Neither
does it require the existing SSL implementation to be disabled or removed. ASSL
leverages parts of the SSL implementation without affecting its operation and so
ASSL additionally benefits from SSL updates such as bug fixes and features.
ASSL is also completely transparent to the client, requiring no specialised software
on the client side. This significantly lowers the bar for ASSL adoption. Clients
can, however, have moderated control of the SSL connection through an interface
provided to them by the specialised 3rd parties who control the Web Server security
(see paragraph below). In either case, clients maintain the right not to send data
on connections below a certain security threshold by either examining the negotiated
connection or simply limiting the algorithms that they claim to support during the
negotiation process.
No restrictions are placed on the type of specialised 3rd party that can control
the session security, though 3rd parties can be authenticated. ASSL does not resolve
conflicts of interest between 3rd parties. Advocating 3rd party SSL control separates
the concerns of SSL security from that of server configuration and so allows truly
concurrent development cycles. The use of 3rd parties also lends itself to creative
and potentially unexpected ASSL usage contexts.
Using SSL’s SSLRequire directive provides adaptation decision rules based on the
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client-server connection. In addition to allowing extensive adaptation decision rules
through arbitrarily complex boolean expressions it also provides this at an appropriate
level of abstraction, clearly separating the potential adaptation concerns. It allows
connection adaptation based on connection parameters. Nothing higher (see Figure
5.1), allowing 3rd parties to consider application specific concerns such as performance
issues or client preferences. And nothing lower, allowing 3rd parties to manage data
specific considerations such as securing data based on the value of the information.
Due to a bug in the implementation, SSLRequire does however require the server to
create client processes using a non-threaded, pre-forking Multi-Processing Module.
Although threading does enable greater scalability the prefork module is the Apache
server default for Linux systems due to its stability and backward compatibility,
amongst others [103].
3rd parties interact with the server through the standard HTTP protocol. This
gives 3rd parties the freedom to write their applications in any language on any
platform. Applications also need not be hosted on the server machine thus allowing
remote server security administration. ASSL supports 3rd party authentication but
does not support encrypted security adaptation requests as the adaptation request is
sent as part of the request URL. This is only a problem if the 3rd party is remote and
ASSL can easily be extended to support this by including the request in the message
body.
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5.2.3 Overhead Evaluation
The following section details a performance overhead evaluation of our Adaptive SSL
module to ascertain its suitability for runtime SSL session management. The chief
overhead concern is that of evaluating client requests against the Request Filter as
this process is executed for every client request. Renegotiating the session security
when a match is found is handled in exactly the same way by both Apache’s SSL and
ASSL and as such is not considered here. In each experiment we compare Apache’s
SSL implementation to a ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case performance scenario for Adaptive
SSL. In the best case the Request Filter list is empty and in the worst case the Re-
quest Filter list is full, containing twenty of the following complex boolean expressions.
%{SSL_CIPHER} =~ m/^(EXP|NULL)/
and %{SSL_CIPHER} =~ m/AES256/
and %{SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE} < 52
and %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192.76.162.[0-9]+$/
and %{REQUEST_FILENAME} =~ m/secure/
and %{REMOTE_URI} =~ m/.mov/
and %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} =~ m/^Mozilla/
When evaluating a client request, each expression evaluates to false and so every
expression in the Request Filter is evaluated for each client request. ASSL+ in Table
5.1 and in related figures in this chapter represents ASSL with a full Request Filter
(the worst case scenario).
We first consider the security overhead for a single client request in experiment
1 to gain insight in the absolute time spent in the ASSL module. Experiment 2
evaluates the effect of this overhead on the server by stressing the server to determine
the maximum number of requests it can process at any one time.
Experimental environment. All experiments were conducted on a 2.80GHz
Intel Pentium 4 with 2GB RAM, running Apache 2.2.3 on Linux Fedora Core 5
(Kernel 2.6.17.11). SSL negotiations were performed with a 1024 bit RSA key and
the RSA-DES-SHA1 cipher suite was utilised. OpenSSL 0.9.8d toolkit was used by
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both Apache’s SSL module and our module. Client workload was generated using
HTTPerf [104] and Autobench [105] was used to simulate a request flow from multiple
clients located on a number of machines. All requests were for a 44 byte index.html
file.
5.2.3.1 Experiment 1
Table 5.1 shows the average time the server takes to process various stages of the client
request before content for the response can be generated. Stages include the server
processing time consumed during negotiation, renegotiation and request decryption.
”Wait for client” indicates server idle time during the negotiation between client and
server. An * indicates that the values are the same as for SSL.
Protocol
Stage SSL ASSL ASSL+
Negotiation 115 * *
Renegotiation 2 61 423
Wait for client 71768 * *
Decryption 354 * *
Table 5.1: Average processing times, in microseconds.
The table shows that in the best case scenario ASSL introduces about 60 microsec-
onds overhead in the renegotiation phase compared to SSL. This increases to up to
close to half a millisecond (423 microseconds) when the Request Filter demands more
processing. To put this into perspective, the table shows that these amounts are easily
outweighed by the time SSL spends in waiting for the client for instance. The over-
head of ASSL in absolute numbers thus seems very minor. Note also that although
SSL’s use of distributed .htaccess configuration files for runtime security changes does
not show up in SSL renegotiation time, it does increase Apache’s request processing
time depending on the size of the .htaccess file. This overhead is avoided by ASSL.
5.2.3.2 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 evaluates the security overhead when the server is under load. We first
note that the maximum number of requests the server can process at any one time
depends greatly on client usage patterns. We therefore conduct two experiments, one
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Figure 5.6: Performance Graph showing 1000 requests per session
where the clients establish few new SSL sessions making many requests per session
and the other where the clients establish a new SSL session per request. In realistic
situations the client behavior will be a mixture of these two extremes. We evaluate
the overall effect of using ASSL in these extreme scenarios.
Scenario 1. In this experiment we evaluate ASSL’s performance for the case
where clients create minimal new SSL sessions when compared to the number of
requests. To that end, 1000 requests are made per session and SSL sessions are
reused. In this scenario the server spends proportionately more time checking for
renegotiations than negotiating new connections. We note that this is due to the fact
that for every SSL session there are many client requests, each of which requiring a
check against the Request Filter for a potential security renegotiation. This should
penalise ASSL’s performance.
Figure 5.6 shows that when using ASSL, Apache experiences peak load between
30% and 85% of the maximum number of requests that SSL can support, depending
on the Request Filter length and complexity. So, we indeed see that checking if
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Figure 5.7: Performance Graph for one request per SSL session
renegotiation is required can be costly and will reduce the amount of clients that can
be supported by a server. Note again that this client behavior represents an extreme
case.
Scenario 2. In this experiment we evaluate ASSL’s performance when clients
create the maximum number of new SSL sessions, namely one session per request. In
this scenario ASSL is only utilised once in each SSL session.
Figure 5.7 shows that even when using a full Request Filter the server incurs
negligible additional overhead when using ASSL under normal client workloads. The
performance does however break down when the server reaches peak load. We think
this is because we hit another bottleneck. We observed that the number of child
processes created by Apache rapidly increases for ASSL and ASSL+ under peak load.
This is likely due to requests waiting for a lock on the Request Filter which results
in Apache not releasing resources allocated to that request. Apache was configured
with a theoretical limit of 40000 child processes and so we believe that the drop in
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performance is likely due to the number of connections that can be supported by the
system itself. A bespoke locking and threading solution could remedy the observed
behavior but this is beyond the scope of our work.
Also note that increasing the requested file size, currently 44 bytes, will increase the
cost of encryption for SSL as well as ASSL and so the additional cost associated with
ASSL will be even smaller relative to the other server costs and so the performance
difference between SSL and ASSL will be less significant. In general terms, the added
functionality of being able to adapt the security level comes at a cost that only
becomes prohibitive when the requested file size is small and the Request Filter is
complex and executed often.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we have shown how to effectively augment cryptographic security
measures between a client and web server with adaptive security features which can
respond to a variety of environmental influences at runtime in a timely and effective
manner. This was achieved through the application of our methodology and adher-
ence to the Adaptation Unit design in Section 4. Through the utilisation of adaptive
design and software engineering principles in Chapter 2 we created a solution which
can easily be adopted by both client and server. It enables extensive adaptation pos-
sibilities through the use of specialised 3rd parties and provides this in an efficient and
performant manner. Experiment 1 showed that the amount of overhead introduced
by ASSL is small (about 60 microseconds) but that the overhead is sensitive to the
contents of the Request Filter (moving up to the order of milliseconds). When stress-
ing the server (Experiment 2) much depends on the client behavior, which determines
what proportion of processing time is spent executing the Request Filter. In partic-
ular, if load experienced by the server is due to an increase in new SSL sessions, i.e
new clients arriving, an ASSL enabled server experiences little additional overhead.
If however server load is experienced due to an increase in the number of requests
per client, ASSL reduces the maximum server load buy 15% or more depending on
Request Filter size.
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Chapter 6
Security-performance trade-off
In Chapter 1 we considered the challenge of choosing the right level of security to
protect a system from potential attackers. The decision has to incorporate a wide
variety of factors from available processing and financial resources to more subjective
factors such as the level of trust in the particular algorithms, expected cryptanalytic
developments or the expected average future cost of computing resources to name but
a few. Many of these factors are often ignored by system administrators and even
when considered only allow them at best to make a “best effort” assessment based
on subjective information. Even once a decision has been made the external factors
on which it was based may also change. Examples include the value of the protected
data or the threat level at a particular moment in time. Therefore making only one
security decision can in itself leave the system at risk or break QoS guarantees.
One could envision an intelligent security system able to use additional resources,
as and when they are available, to address this problem. To this end we chose to con-
sider the web server environment as our problem domain, focusing on security guar-
antees provided through the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol for client-server in-
teractions. We have studied and evaluated current implementations of cryptographic
algorithms used in SSL and have shown that the implementations themselves play
a significant part in the expected algorithm performance. Due to the lack of Adap-
tive Security literature in the area we designed and implemented our own Adaptive
SSL solution which adapts at runtime between these cryptographic algorithms. We
now build on this research by formulating and demonstrating an effective security-
performance trade-off.
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In this chapter we apply the next three steps of our methodology. Since we have
already chosen a crosscutting concern, i.e. system performance, we start by apply-
ing step three of the methodology in the System Analysis section (Section 6.1). In
this section we identify measurable factors which influence the security-performance
relationship. Through offline experimentation we study their impact under different
client load conditions in Section 6.2. This in effect creates a representation of the
security-performance interrelationship as detailed in the graphs in Section 6.3.5. The
offline data is the Service States data as described in our Design, Section 4.2.
In the final section, Section 6.3, the last step of the methodology is applied. Though
runtime measurement of the aforementioned cross-cutting concern and utilisation of
the precomputed Service States we endeavour to reach our trade-off goal.
6.1 System Analysis
To trade off security and performance we first study their interrelationship. To better
understand the performance impact of a security adaptation on the server we break
down the SSL security cost into its constituent elements and identify the relevant
server side SSL security mechanisms which contribute to the security cost. We sec-
ondly investigate how client behaviour affect the load each mechanism places on the
server and how this influences the overall server load when an adaptation is actuated.
6.1.1 SSL costs
The first mechanism to consider is SSL session negotiation. Through this negotiation
process each client establishes a secure SSL session with the server (as explained
in Section 5.1). Negotiation occurs once per session and sessions are re-used for a
number of future requests. The handshake protocol (Section 5.1.1.2) is expensive,
involving the creation of the necessary key data as well as a number of client-server
message exchanges.
The server also has to manage the security state of all current clients. This involves
storing and retrieving relevant client information from the security cache when a
request is made.
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Table 6.1: Average number of bytes processed per second (rounded to the nearest 100).
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Throughput (kB/s)
RC4 112000
AES 128 36000
AES 192 30600
AES 256 26500
DES 19300
3DES 6900
Lastly the server is responsible for cryptography as it needs to decrypt client
requests and encrypt the relevant responses.
Adapting the security, i.e. changing the security algorithm used, only has a server
performance impact for encryption and decryption. It therefore follows that if the
server is busy and it spends a large proportion of its processing resources on cryptog-
raphy, changing the security would have a significant performance benefit. If however
the server is busy but it spends more time managing the security and less time on
cryptography then adapting the security would have less of a performance impact.
6.1.2 Client load patterns
In aid of identifying the actual relation between server load and the resource require-
ments of the server security mechanisms discussed in Section 6.1.1, we investigate the
following aspects of client load patterns in the next section (Section 6.2):
Security Algorithm The performance cost incurred by the server through en-
cryption and decryption is significantly influenced by the particular software imple-
mentation as we have shown in [90]. For our experiments we have chosen to use
OpenSSL [86] version 0.9.8d. Table 6.1 shows the average measured throughput for
each algorithm. Slower algorithms should result in lower server throughput. Ta-
ble 6.1 shows that 3DES is the slowest algorithm and is about 16 times slower than
RC4 which is the fastest. Care should be taken as slower algorithms do not necessar-
ily provide more protection. This is highly implementation dependent. For instance
in this version of OpenSSL (0.9.8d) AES provides more protection and outperforms
DES whereas in OpenSSL version 0.9.7f it performs worse.
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Data size The size of the requested data has a direct impact on the cryptography
cost. The average file size is determined by the type of web site or e-commerce
application accessed as well as client behavior.
Session duration The length of time clients spend using the service has a signifi-
cant impact on the SSL management cost. Longer sessions results in more concurrent
users which means larger security cache which leads to an increase in client status
retrieval costs from the cache.
Each of the above client load patterns affect the proportion of resources allocated
to each security mechanism and so influence the performance impact of adapting the
security when the server is under load. We investigate the extent of such an impact
through experimentation in the next section.
6.2 Experiments
Through experimentation this section will determine the performance impact of a
security adaptation under the client load patterns identified in Section 6.1 and in so
doing bring to light the interrelationship between performance and security. As we
anticipated in Section 6.1.2 we will see that the level of cryptography, file size and
session length play key roles and we will discover the extent of their impact.
All experiments were conducted on a 100Mb/s ethernet test bed of 11 identical
Pentium III 866MHz machines with 512Mb RAM. Apache 2.2.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.8d
toolkit was used.
Parameters chosen for the experiments are loosely based on the findings in [106].
Each experiment is based on a scenario where clients arrive at the server with in-
creasing frequency, each client creating a new SSL session. Every client makes 64
consecutive requests at intervals of 4s average in a session. A client will wait no more
than 6s for a reply after which it continues immediately with the next request.
For ease of reading, all figures show the load in requests per second (req/s) on the
x-axis rather than in sessions/s. Response time (y-axis) represents the time between
the client sending a request and receiving the response (encrytion/decryption time
included).
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In this section we first present the load generator we implemented to handle the
adaptive nature of our experiments. Thereafter we consider to what extent client load
patterns affect the performance cost or gain when a security adaptation is initiated.
6.2.1 Load Generator
Load generators simulate multiple client requests to a server. Due to the lack of
SSL enabled load generating software that can handle an SSL adaptation, we built a
custom tool utilising and extending Jakarta Commons’ HttpClient 3.1 modules [107].
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Figure 6.1: Load generator tool
As can be seen in Figure 6.1 the tool establishes new client sessions with the
server at a certain rate (λ), following a Poisson process with some mean. Within
each session the client can make multiple requests (λn), the average request rate also
follows a Poisson process with some mean. The tool allows for both mean client
arrival and request rates to be changed during an experiment to better simulate real
client load. It also maintains a unique security state for each client session instead of
sharing session information amongst clients. Many SSL enabled load generators share
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this information for memory and performance reasons. Storing unique information
for each client allows the server to adapt the security for all or only some clients,
when the session is being established or during a session.
In addition to automated collection and graphing of results the tool provides a
combination of features which are not provided as a feature set in other freeware
software applications (features may be present in isolation in other load generating
tools). The set of essential supported features are as follows. Firstly the SSL protocol
is used to secure client sessions. Simulated clients are also divided amongst N physical
machines to reduce the chance that the client machine becomes the bottleneck. (i.e.
When results indicate that maximum server throughput is reached it is due to server-
rather than client machine overload) The tool also allows SSL secured sessions to be
renegotiated at runtime. Additionally, a unique SSL session state is used for each
client rather than sharing SSL state information on the server side amongst sessions
to reduce load on the server machine. This better simulates real client load on the
server. I.e. the server has to manage a separate state for each client and so the
load on the server more closely resembles a real world scenario. It also allows the
server to initiate a SSL renegotiation for a subset of clients. It furthermore provides
non-deterministic client arrival and request rates to better simulate real client load.
Lastly, simulated clients are created using a low overhead threading mechanism to
support high client arrival rates. This allows the clients to place the server under
heavy load without the client machines becoming the bottleneck.
6.2.2 Security Algorithm
In this experiment we show the performance impact of the OpenSSL cryptography
algorithms in Table 6.1. Requests are made for a 8192B file. Client arrival rate starts
at 10 new clients every 2.5s (240 req/s), each client behaving as described above, and
continues, decreasing delay between each batch of 10 client arrivals by 0.1s every time,
until the server is overloaded. All response times under 250ms exhibit 90% confidence
intervals of under 2ms and all response times over 250ms have 90% confidence intervals
under 10ms.
Figure 6.2 shows that under increasing load the server can serve approximately
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290 req/s using 3DES before it becomes overloaded. It can however serve 10%-30%
more requests per second if it uses another algorithm. The figure shows that the
server becomes overloaded in the order shown in Table 6.1, though for this particular
file size and level of client concurrency RC4 only outperforms 3DES by 30% rather
than the 16 fold increase shown in the Table 6.1. This is likely due to the fact that
the resources the server has to delegate to the other tasks are relatively large per
request compared to the resources allocated to cryptography and so the difference in
cryptography performance is not so pronounced.
Nevertheless, we see clearly that the choice of encryption algorithm matters as it
determines the maximum server throughout. Using a different level of security could
therefore increase the number of clients supported by 10%-30%.
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Figure 6.2: Cryptographic protocol overhead
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6.2.3 Data size
This experiment shows the performance impact when requesting three different file
sizes, 1024, 8192 and 12288 bytes. Client arrival rate starts at 10 new clients every
3.1s, decreasing delay between arrivals by 0.1s every time. All response times under
150ms exhibit 90% confidence intervals of under 2ms and all response times over
150ms have 90% confidence intervals under 5ms. The point at which the server
overloads is the last plotted point on the figure, after which the response time shoots
up.
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Figure 6.3: DES and 3DES performance under different file sizes
Figure 6.3 shows that when comparing DES and 3DES the difference in maximum
throughput that that server can achieve grows to almost 30% as the file size increases.
In other words, if clients request a small file size, such as 1024 bytes, the server
gains almost no additional throughput if the security is adapted from 3DES to DES.
This however increases to almost 30% as file size increases. For 12288 byte files the
maximum server throughput increases by almost 30% from 232 req/s to 296 req/s
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when security is adapted from 3DES to DES.
The figure also shows that considering requests per second only is not sufficient
in deciding whether to adapt as the average requested file size plays a key role in its
effect on the system load. For example; changing from DES to 3DES encryption at
242 req/s would overload the system if large files (12288B) are requested but would
be relatively safe for files of 8192 bytes or less.
Since there is little difference in performance for smaller files, higher security should
always be used in such cases. ASSL therefore has a more significant impact in sce-
narios where the client may be viewing or downloading larger files from a service.
Examples could include online photo albums, music downloads, email attachments,
etc.
6.2.4 Session duration
This experiment shows the performance impact of adapting security as client session
time varies. 64 requests per session are made by all clients. Clients with short session
lengths finish their 64 requests in 6.4 seconds (10 req/s) and clients with longer session
lengths finish theirs in 256 seconds (0.25 req/s). Client arrival rate starts at 10 new
clients every 3.1s and 8192B files are requested. All response times under 200ms
exhibit 90% confidence intervals of under 2ms and all response times over 200ms have
90% confidence intervals under 5ms.
Figure 6.4 shows that adapting security from 3DES to DES for shorter sessions
achieves a 35% throughput increase compared to 7% for longer sessions of 256s.
Longer session durations mean more concurrent clients at the server which in turn
results in more SSL management overhead. We therefore observe a smaller server
performance impact due to cryptography adaptation.
In practice client behavior exhibits a mixture of session durations with the average
duration dependant on the type of service hosted on the server.
ASSL shows promise in scenarios where server load is a result of frequent client-
server interactions rather than SSL management costs due to long client sessions.
Highly interactive web sites where clients are likely to finish quickly will therefore ex-
hibit a large performance gain when adapting security using ASSL. Highly interactive
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Figure 6.4: DES and 3DES performance with varying session duration
web pages are also becoming more prevalent on the web since the advent of Web 2.0.
It should also be noted that single server pages are often made up of various
pieces of information such as images, style sheets, and scripts. Each client request
therefore resulting in several additional automated requests per page. Sites where
frequent client-server interactions are generated in this automated way will therefore
also exhibit a larger performance gain.
6.3 Security-performance trade-off
Through a use-case scenario, based on the results obtained in Section 6.2, this section
will trade off security and performance to achieve our trade-off goal. Namely, to show
how Adaptive SSL can successfully maximise security by utilising available processing
resources whilst still respecting client QoS requirements.
To achieve this we implement our Adaptive Security Service design as detailed in
Section 4.2.
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The first component to consider is the Monitor Unit which collects data relating
to the current system resources. Results are passed to the Trade-off Engine where
adaptation policies determine the performance cost/benefit of a security adaptation
based on the collected Service States information. Security is adapted through the
Adaptation Unit.
The ASSL module represents the Adaptation Unit allowing effective security adap-
tation at runtime. ASSL does not stipulate its intended use and so we are able to
extend the solution with our own specialised 3rd party software and complete the
feedback loop.
In this chapter we first present the scenario to which our adaptive system will
react. We demonstrate how a non-adaptive system responds in this scenario. We
then consider two adaptation policies based on our results from Section 6.2 for the
Trade-off Engine. The chosen policy is implemented as part of our specialised 3rd
party software and employed in the scenario to demonstrate its practical utility. The
Monitor Unit is also part of our 3rd party implementation though much responsibility
is delegated to specialised system level monitoring software.
6.3.1 Use-case scenario
The use-case will depict a scenario where a server experiences a sudden influx of client
arrivals. The server has three available cryptography algorithms. In increasing order
of security and performance cost they are RC4, DES and 3DES. For this scenario RC4
is considered adequate to protect the available data, though as discussed in Chapter
1 a security threat inevitably remains. Clients also expect a certain level of Quality
of Service in that they will not wait indefinitely for a server response.
We will first show how the client arrival influx affects the server when using each
security level. We then demonstrate how ASSL can improve on the required security
level (i.e. RC4) whilst respecting client QoS requirements.
6.3.2 Experiment setup
For this use-case the client behavior is as follows. Each client has an average session
duration of 256 seconds consisting of 64 requests at 4 second intervals. Each request
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is for a 12288B file.
For the first 500s 10 clients arrive every 3s (combined average request rate, as
perceived by the server, is 200 req/s). The next 250s client arrivals increase to 10
clients every 2.5s (245 req/s) and then decreases back to 200 req/s for the last 500s.
Each of the throughput values on the figure is a throughput average over a 10s interval.
The Poisson client arrival and request processes are based on a fixed set of random
number generated seed values, and so the figures show a particular experiment trace.
The particular trace however has little impact on the average throughput every 10s
due to the large number of requests in each 10s interval. Experiments were also
done multiple times with different seeds to calculate the average number of timed out
requests, i.e. those requests that broke the client QoS requirements. Other details on
the experimental setup can be found in Section 6.2.
We will show that both RC4 and DES can cope under the client load influx whereas
the more secure 3DES can not. We will also show that ASSL can support the client
load and additionally use available server resources to increase the security.
6.3.3 Basic security (RC4)
Figure 6.5 shows the server throughput under client behavior described above when
using RC4 encryption. The figure depicts a server that can cope under client load.
Additional results affirm this as no client requests timed out (i.e. all replies were
received within 6s. See Section 6.2). Repeating the experiment a number of times
with different seed values also produced no timeouts.
In Figure 6.5 clients start to arrive in batches of 10 every 3s for the first 500s. After
256s clients also start to leave the system (they have completed their 64 requests)
and the server throughput stabilises at 200 req/s. The second (245 req/s for 250s)
and third (200 req/s for 500s) phase of the experiment show the client arrival influx
and also behave as expected.
The server throughput figure for DES is similar to Figure 6.5 albeit at a higher
CPU load. We can see in Figure 6.3 that DES can also sustain a request rate of 245
req/s whilst respecting the 6s client QoS constraint. No client timeouts were recorded
for DES.
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Figure 6.5: Server throughput using RC4
6.3.4 High security (3DES)
Figure 6.6 shows the server throughput when using 3DES under the same client
behavior as above. The bar graph additionally shows the percentage of requests
which timeout in each interval. It depicts a scenario where the server does not cope
under client load. We can also see this in Figure 6.3 where the server overloads
before 245 req/s when using 3DES. From Figure 6.6 we can see that requests start
to timeout 500s into the experiment when the client load increases beyond the level
at which the server can cope. Because clients only submit the next request after
receiving a response for the previous one, clients make fewer requests per second as
they have to wait longer for a reply and so server throughput drops. Due to the slower
request rate the sessions also become longer and so as more and more clients arrive
at this higher rate the number of concurrent sessions also increase. More concurrent
sessions results in an increase in the total request rate, although nearly all of the
requests time out. Even when no more new clients arrive after 1250s, and current
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Figure 6.6: Server throughput using 3DES
clients finish their sessions, most of the requests still time out. This is likely due to
the fact that the server is still buffering and waiting to serve old client requests, as
it has no way of knowing that the client has timed out, and so the new requests still
have to wait until the buffers have cleared by which time they might also have timed
out.
For 3DES in total 144642 client requests timed out. Repeating the experiment 6
times with different seed values showed an average timeout of 148737 with a deviation
of 1444 at 90% confidence interval.
This experiment showed how performance degrades in a standard non-adaptive
server when an influx of client arrivals overload the server.
6.3.5 Adaptive security
This section will show how Adaptive SSL can be utilised in this scenario to trade
off security and performance by using the available processing resources to increase
security whilst still respecting client QoS requirements. We implement our own spe-
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cialised 3rd party application to monitor system load and make adaptation decisions.
It adapts the security by interacting with our Adaptive SSL solution as discussed in
Chapter 5.
Based on the client load patterns studied we develop two policies to trade off secu-
rity and performance. One through direct and the other through indirect monitoring
of the server throughput. The most promising policy candidate is implemented as
part of our 3rd party application and shown through experimentation to be an effective
and robust solution.
6.3.5.1 Throughput policy
This policy depends on direct monitoring of the server throughput. In particular
we consider monitoring throughput with a view to adapt the security based on the
current average requested file size. We extend the experiments in Section 6.2.3 with
results for file sizes 16384 and 20480 bytes and plot only the maximum achievable
server throughput in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Peak server throughput for DES and 3DES under different file sizes
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The figure shows that the difference in peak server throughput between DES and
3DES remains constant for files sizes greater than 12288 bytes. This is an unex-
pected result for which we cannot account but which consistently shows up in our
experiments. One would expect the difference in peak performance to continue to
diverge.
From the figure we derive two approximate functions for DES and 3DES using
the last two points plotted. We note that this is only an approximation and can be
derived in any number of different ways.
fdes(x) = − 13x2048 + 384
f3des(x) = − 13x2048 + 299
The policy utilises the functions to adapt security at runtime as follows. Let T be
the current server throughput, x the average requested file size and enc the current
security algorithm. enc+1 and enc-1 denotes an increase and decrease in security
respectively.
If T ≥ fenc(x) then
fenc−1(x)
Else if T < fenc+1(x) then
fenc+1(x)
The policy reads as follows. If the current server throughput T reaches the peak
throughput the server can maintain under security level enc and average file size x
then decrease the security. If however the current server throughput T is low enough to
increase the security then do so. It would also be prudent to adapt the security before
the maximum throughput is reached. Examples could include defining a throughput
range before the maximum throughput in which the security can be adapted or a
more advanced technique by which the expected throughput for the next throughput
measurement is predicted based on the current throughput rate of change. This is
however beyond the scope of this thesis.
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It should be noted that although file size is considered here the average session
length also plays a key role. Similar graphs and policies can be formulated to consider
variations in session length.
One major concern of measuring server throughput directly is the monitoring cost.
Monitoring itself could overload the system or negate performance benefits achieved
through adaptation [17]. We consider an alternative in the next section.
6.3.5.2 CPU load policy
This policy depends on indirect monitoring of the server throughput by recognising
that increased throughput implies increased server CPU load. The operating system
already monitors CPU load as a background process. This information can be utilised
cheaply by our adaptive policy rather than implementing a bespoke application level
throughput monitoring system which may adversely affect the maximum throughput
results obtained thus far.
In order to utilise the available resources one needs to know how much of it is free
as well as how much will be required or freed when the security is adapted.
Figure 6.8 shows the server performance implications for the three levels of en-
cryption when clients have an average session duration of 256s and request files of
12288 bytes each. The figure shows the average CPU load at different client arrival
rates, starting with 10 clients every 3.1s (i.e. total number of requests as perceived
by the server is 195 req/s) and reducing the delay between arrivals by 0.1s each time
until the server is overloaded. CPU % is the average CPU load measured using iostat
[108]. 100% implies that the CPU is fully utilised and potentially have further idle
tasks waiting to use the CPU.
The figure shows that using 3DES the server overloads just after 230 req/s with
DES and RC4 just after 296 req/s (not shown). This affirms the results in Figure
6.3 and provides further insight. The figure also shows that a server with load over
70% and using DES should not consider adapting to 3DES because a server under
the same client throughput and using 3DES would be overloaded. This is also true
of moving from RC4 to DES over 50% and from RC4 to 3DES over 40%. Decreasing
the security is also prudent when the CPU utilisation reaches 100%.
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Using the insights gained above we provide an adaptation policy in Table 6.2
that will more effectively utilise the available resources to improve security without
overloading the server and so break client QoS requirements.
Table 6.2: Adaptive SSL policy reference.
New protocol
Current protocol 3DES DES RC4
3DES X 100 100
DES 70 X 100
RC4 40 50 X
Pseudo code for the adaptation algorithm is provided below. It compares the
current CPU level with the values in Table 6.2 and determines whether the current
level of security should be changed. The code first determines the current security
protocol in the first column of the table and moves to position X in that row. It
then considers increasing the security by comparing the current CPU load with all
the values to the left in that row. If the current CPU level is less than the particular
value security can be increased to the algorithm that column represents. For example,
if the current security is DES we move to the X in row 2 column 2. The current CPU
load is compared to the value in the 3DES column to the left. If CPU load is low
enough for an increase in security, i.e. CPU < 70%, then 3DES is selected. The same
is done for values to the right (using the >= operator) to determine if security should
rather be decreased.
#comment
load = getCpuLoad
PolicyTable(row, column)
curSec #current Security level
newSec #new Security level
#Move to X
Move to PolicyTable(curSec,curSec)
#Check if security should be increased
#Check all values to the left
IF load < PolicyTable(curSec, curSec - n)
RECORD newSec
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#Check if security should be decreased
#Check all values to the right
IF load >= PolicyTable(CurSec, CurSec + n)
RECORD newSec
IF newSec THEN adapt
Monitoring costs are a known performance concern for many systems [17]. We we
seek to avoid this by utilising a policy based on CPU load in the next section.
6.3.5.3 Adaptive Experiment
For this experiment the CPU was monitored during the use-case scenario using iostat
[108]. Every 10s our CPU monitoring program computes the average CPU load
recorded over the previous 10s by iostat and adapts the ASSL security based on the
CPU policy in Section 6.3.5.2.
Table 6.3: Adaptive SSL security adaptations.
New security At time (s)
3DES 0
DES 450
RC4 460
DES 720
3DES 780
Table 6.3 shows when security was adapted in Figure 6.9. The values show that
through utilising ASSL the CPU monitor was able to effectively maximise security
for most of the experiment duration. All new clients arriving before 460s and all new
clients arriving after 720s received better than the recommended security level.
It also did this whilst maintaining the client QoS requirements. Figure 6.9 depicts
a scenario where the server can cope under the client load. In total, only 8 client
requests timed out. From the figure we can see that the CPU load was effectively
reduced during the client influx at around 500s by decreasing the security level to
DES and then to RC4 (see Table 6.3) and so preventing the server from overloading
and respecting the client QoS requirements. Once the server load decreased to a safe
level below 50% (see Table 6.2) the security was increased to DES and then to 3DES
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in the same manner. The figure thus shows the server CPU load increasing again
after approximately 750s.
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Figure 6.9: Server throughput under ASSL security
We observe that the security was reduced twice in a short period of time (once at
450s and again at 460s) and also increased rapidly in a short interval (once at 720s
and again at 780s). This is due to the fact that the first security change has perhaps
not had time to make a significant enough impact on the server load before the next
chance for adaptation occurs. Of course if the time between adaptations is increased
and the increase in arrival rate is large enough for the first adaptation to make little
impact then the server would become overloaded. Choices on how frequently an
average should be taken and how many seconds an average should account for is a
needs based decision and dependant on the environment the server is deployed in.
Drawing from the details in this section it should be noted that our adaptation
policy is very robust to client behavior. Firstly, security is reduced as soon as the
server reaches its maximum load. This is due to the short CPU sample times (10s)
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as well as the fact that our policy does not wait to determine if the load might
decrease or stabilise but reduces the security immediately. Secondly, security is only
increased if the server could cope with the same load at a higher security level. When
security is adapted only new clients start with the higher level of security and so it
takes some time before the server is serving all clients at this new level. Our policy is
therefore very cautious with respect to increasing security and potentially overloading
the system or breaking client QoS.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we showed the benefits of applying our methodology. We analysed
the server performance cost resulting from an SSL security adaption under different
client loads and behaviours and showed how this information can be successfully
exploited to predict the future system state when deciding whether to adapt the
security. We demonstated that this information can successfully be used to create
intelligent adaptation policies.
We have shown that the average requested file size and the SSL session duration
has a significant influence on the performance impact of a security adaptation and so
should be considered in addition to the server processing load or client throughput.
Adapting security has a greater server performance impact when requested files are
large and when clients make multiple short requests. Consequently the server may
choose to provide better security for smaller files and clients with longer sessions or
less security if files become prohibitively large and sessions are short.
We showed how server throughput and client QoS can degrade during an influx of
client arrivals if the default security level is high in a standard non-adaptive server.
We demonstrated that ASSL can effectively allow our 3rd party software to adapt
SSL security at runtime in a real system. We also formulated a robust adaptation
policy and showed that it can provide better security by utilising available resources.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we recognise that achieving complete “separation of concerns” between
SSL security and performance is merely a fool’s hope. To resolve this contention we
deferred the trade off from design time to runtime, thus allowing an informed trade
off policy specification based on up to date contextual information only available at
runtime. To that end we specified our goal as follows: To “Demonstrate the practical
utility of Adaptive Security in trading off security and QoS at runtime.”
We first provide an overview of the thesis, reflecting on the principles and key
lessons learnt in Section 7.1. We conclude the chapter and the thesis with insights
into potential future research directions.
7.1 Principles & Key lessons
The underlying principal focus and driving force in this thesis is the desire to move
security decisions from a design or deployment time decision to that of a runtime
decision. Many systems, architectures and frameworks currently exist to support
such runtime decisions but the challenge we address in this thesis lies in moving
such a decision from a static design/deployment time decision to a dynamic runtime
decision. This concept is at the heart of our methodology which takes legacy security
systems and provides steps to realise an adaptive security system.
When implementing the methodology a number of key lessons have been learnt
which provide further insight to our core contributions:
Firstly, we have found that an effective methodology must fully realise the auto-
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nomic feedback loop mechanism. In so doing the methodology fully considers the
significant facets of an adaptive system and as an end result produces an adaptive
security system where the adaptation is not an emergent property of the system but
explicitly represented in the system structure. The methodology does not encourage
changing the existing system but instead advocates building on top of and around
the existing system such that the legacy system becomes in effect only one phase of
the adaptive feedback loop.
Secondly, the significant value of offline data in making complex runtime decisions.
Such data is not only practical in that these potentially resource intensive processes
are used to compute data offline but also allows for more complex runtime decision
making. It allows for the offline study of the interrelationship between security and the
crosscutting concern so that complex considerations regarding the future state of the
system can then be made at runtime before a security decision is taken. This offline
data lies at the core of our intelligent adaptive policy contributions which not only
take into account the effect previous security adaptations have on the crosscutting
concern but also predicts the future impact of security adaptations.
There are also a number of design and implementation challenges in following
the methodology. A noteworthy part of this contribution is the performant nature
of Adaptive SSL and the extended infrastructure. Having chosen performance as
the crosscutting concern places additional requirements on the system in supporting
adaptation without adversely affecting the crosscutting concern. The adaptation
decision itself is however only part of the performance cost. Due to the feedback
loop nature of the design and the emphasis placed on building on top of and around
the existing legacy system one quickly accumulates additional components which all
need to share in the processing resources. We note that the monitoring component
often plays a significant role in these costs. An additional implementation challenge
which must be met in following the methodology was to gain control of the security
decision making process in the legacy system. Accomplishing this and providing a
performant implementation of the design led to the achievement of our goal, namely
“Demonstrating the practical utility of Adaptive Security in trading off security and
QoS at runtime”
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7.2 Future direction
In light of the diverse scope and novel nature of our research area there are a plethora
of potential research directions to explore. We highlight the key areas we find of
particular interest.
Firstly we consider experimental extensions of our research contribution. One
such area already mentioned relates to when the adaptation occurs. In this thesis
we adapted security when the server reached overload for a particular encryption
algorithm, file size and session duration combination. It may however be prudent to
adapt the security before an overload level is reached. One could consider defining a
range of values within which to adapt the security before overload occurs such that
if currentLoad ≥ overload - n security must be adapted. Finding a suitable value
for n would be the objective in this case. One may also consider predicting the next
server load measurement based on the current request rate increase or decrease and so
adapt the security preemptively. i.e. if expected load l ≥ r × t (where r is the change
in client request rate and t the time at which the new measurement will be taken)
then the security must be adapted. Logging server load over a number of weeks to
establish expected client behaviour may also prove useful in preemptively adapting
security. Further analysis of the adaptation process itself could also prove insightful.
Various adaptation heuristics could be explored in understanding the performance
effect of a security adaptation; adapting security for only a percentage of the clients
may be appropriate. One can also consider a scenario where clients with different
security levels are using the system and adapting the security for only certain groups
of clients may achieve the desired performance goal. The total server processing cost
for adaptation can also vary depending on the definition of adaptation. Adaptation
may imply changing server security for all new clients, changing security for all clients
at any particular moment in time or re-authenticating clients. Each method varying
in processing and bandwidth overhead.
Secondly an alternate approach to the design and development of Adaptive SSL can
also be considered. A design which additionally utilises client side code presents an
opportunity to use multiple SSL sessions per client. Such concurrent sessions can rep-
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resent different security levels and adapting security implies sending data over a more
or less secure session. We therefore avoid the need for session renegotiation. Data
units (e.g. a single web page) can also be fragmented into sections, sent over multiple
SSL sessions and reconstructed on the client/server side. This has the additional cost
of maintaining multiple concurrent SSL sessions per client and reconstruction of data
units but allows for immediate added protection for particular sections that require it
as well as adding minimal performance overhead during adaptation. A policy design
that does not depend on pre-computed offline measurements may also prove useful.
To that end one could adapt Queueing theory models for multiple job types to model
and predict adaptation benefits.
Finally we consider research endeavours in the general area of Adaptive Security.
To effectively evaluate security in an automated fashion it must be quantified. “Can
we Quantitatively Assess Security?” [109] provides an overview of such research
ranging from evaluating cryptographic key sizes [15], as is used in this thesis, to using
Markovian theory [110]. An interesting extension of our work would be to quantify
security in such a way that it can be directly traded off with performance using some
utility function. Current literature suggests that inspiration for such a trade off might
be found in the area of control engineering [17].
An Adaptive Security system that can take all security concerns into account,
evaluate system Quality of Service and trade them off without human interaction
still requires a considerable amount of active research. One fact however is slowly
being accepted by the research community, and to this our research attests, security
is not... absolute.
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Appendix A
SSLRequire Directive [1]
The SSLRequire directive is an arbitrarily complex boolean expression specifying, in the case of
ASSL, a condition for security re-/negotiation. The expression matches the following Backus-Naur
Form syntax:
expr ::= "true" | "false"
| "” expr!
| expr "&&" expr
| expr "||" expr
| "(" expr ")"
| comp
comp ::= word "==" word | word "eq" word
| word "!=" word | word "ne" word
| word "<" word | word "lt" word
| word "<=" word | word "le" word
| word ">" word | word "gt" word
| word ">=" word | word "ge" word
| word "in" "{" wordlist "}"
| word "=~" regex
| word "!~" regex
wordlist ::= word
| wordlist "," word
word ::= digit
| cstring
| variable
| function
digit ::= [0-9]+ cstring ::= "..."
107
variable ::= "%{" varname "}"
function ::= funcname "(" funcargs ")"
... where funcname is the function file(filename) which takes a string argument and expands the
contents of the file. varname represents any of the SSL variables in Table A.1 or CGI and Apache
variables below.
Standard CGI/1.0 and Apache variables:
HTTP_USER_AGENT PATH_INFO AUTH_TYPE
HTTP_REFERER QUERY_STRING SERVER_SOFTWARE
HTTP_COOKIE REMOTE_HOST API_VERSION
HTTP_FORWARDED REMOTE_IDENT TIME_YEAR
HTTP_HOST IS_SUBREQ TIME_MON
HTTP_PROXY_CONNECTION DOCUMENT_ROOT TIME_DAY
HTTP_ACCEPT SERVER_ADMIN TIME_HOUR
HTTP:headername SERVER_NAME TIME_MIN
THE_REQUEST SERVER_PORT TIME_SEC
REQUEST_METHOD SERVER_PROTOCOL TIME_WDAY
REQUEST_SCHEME REMOTE_ADDR TIME
REQUEST_URI REMOTE_USER ENV:variablename
REQUEST_FILENAME
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Table A.1: SSL variables [111]
Variable Name Value Type Description
HTTPS flag HTTPS is being used
SSL PROTOCOL string The SSL protocol version
(SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1)
SSL SESSION ID string The hex-encoded SSL session id
SSL CIPHER string The cipher specification name
SSL CIPHER EXPORT string true if cipher is an export cipher
SSL CIPHER USEKEYSIZE number Number of cipher bits (actually
used)
SSL CIPHER ALGKEYSIZE number Number of cipher bits (possible)
SSL VERSION INTERFACE string The mod ssl program version
SSL VERSION LIBRARY string The OpenSSL program version
SSL CLIENT M VERSION string The version of the client certifi-
cate
SSL CLIENT M SERIAL string The serial of the client certificate
SSL CLIENT S DN string Subject DN in client’s certificate
SSL CLIENT S DN x509 string Component of client’s Subject
DN
SSL CLIENT I DN string Issuer DN of client’s certificate
SSL CLIENT I DN x509 string Component of client’s Issuer DN
SSL CLIENT V START string Validity of client’s certificate
(start time)
SSL CLIENT V END string Validity of client’s certificate
(end time)
SSL CLIENT A SIG string Algorithm used for the signature
of client’s certificate
SSL CLIENT A KEY string Algorithm used for the public
key of client’s certificate
SSL CLIENT CERT string PEM-encoded client certificate
SSL CLIENT CERT CHAIN string PEM-encoded certificates in
client certificate chain
SSL CLIENT VERIFY string NONE, SUCCESS, GENEROUS
or FAILED:reason
SSL SERVER M VERSION string The version of the server certifi-
cate
SSL SERVER M SERIAL string The serial of the server certificate
SSL SERVER S DN string Subject DN in server’s certificate
SSL SERVER S DN x509 string Component of server’s Subject
DN
SSL SERVER I DN string Issuer DN of server’s certificate
SSL SERVER I DN x509 string Component of server’s Issuer DN
SSL SERVER V START string Validity of server’s certificate
(start time)
SSL SERVER V END string Validity of server’s certificate
(end time)
SSL SERVER A SIG string Algorithm used for the signature
of server’s certificate
SSL SERVER A KEY string Algorithm used for the public
key of server’s certificate
SSL SERVER CERT string PEM-encoded server certificate
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Appendix B
SSLCipherSuite Directive [2]
SSLCipherSuite directive is a colon separated list, in preferential order, of all algorithm combinations
(or ciphers) to be considered for an SSL or ASSL security re-/negotiation. The ciphers may be listed
separately as in Table B.2 and B.3 or specified using aliases listed in Table B.1. A combination of
elements in the two tables may also be used and can be manipulated with the following prefixes:
• No prefix: add cipher to list
• + add ciphers to list and pull them to current location in list
• - remove cipher from list (can be added later again)
• ! kill cipher from list completely (can not be added later again)
For example; The SSLCipherSuite “ALL:!ADH:RC4+SHA:+MEDIUM:+SSLv2” indicates that
all ciphers in Table B.3 should be included with the exception of those containing anonymous key
exchange algorithms. Ciphers that use RC4 and SHA should be listed next followed by all ciphers
that use 128 bit encryption (i.e. MEDIUM) and then all SSLv2 ciphers.
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Table B.1: SSL alias list [2]
Alias Description
ALL all SSL ciphers
SSLv2 all SSL version 2.0 ciphers
SSLv3 all SSL version 3.0 ciphers
TLSv1 all TLS version 1.0 ciphers
EXP all export ciphers
EXPORT40 all 40-bit export ciphers only
EXPORT56 all 56-bit export ciphers only
LOW all low strength ciphers (no export, single DES)
MEDIUM all ciphers with 128 bit encryption
HIGH all ciphers using Triple-DES
RSA all ciphers using RSA key exchange
DH all ciphers using Diffie-Hellman key exchange
EDH all ciphers using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange
ADH all ciphers using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman key exchange
DSS all ciphers using DSS authentication
NULL all ciphers using no encryption
Table B.2: SSL algorithm list [2]
Tag Description
kRSA RSA key exchange
kDHr Diffie-Hellman key exchange with RSA key
kDHd Diffie-Hellman key exchange with DSA key
kEDH Ephemeral (temp.key) Diffie-Hellman key exchange (no
cert)
aNULL No authentication
aRSA RSA authentication
aDSS DSS authentication
aDH Diffie-Hellman authentication
eNULL No encryption
DES DES encryption
3DES Triple-DES encryption
RC4 RC4 encryption
RC2 RC2 encryption
IDEA IDEA encryption
MD5 MD5 hash function
SHA1 SHA1 hash function
SHA SHA hash function
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Table B.3: Example of SSL Algorithm list [2]
Cipher-Tag Protocol Key Ex-
change
Authentication Encryption MAC
DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA 3DES(168) SHA1
DES-CBC3-MD5 SSLv2 RSA RSA 3DES(168) MD5
IDEA-CBC-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA IDEA(128) SHA1
RC4-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA RC4(128) SHA1
RC4-MD5 SSLv3 RSA RSA RC4(128) MD5
IDEA-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 RSA RSA IDEA(128) MD5
RC2-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 RSA RSA RC2(128) MD5
RC4-MD5 SSLv2 RSA RSA RC4(128) MD5
DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA DES(56) SHA1
RC4-64-MD5 SSLv2 RSA RSA RC4(64) MD5
DES-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 RSA RSA DES(56) MD5
EXP-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 RSA(512) RSA DES(40) SHA1
EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 SSLv3 RSA(512) RSA RC2(40) MD5
EXP-RC4-MD5 SSLv3 RSA(512) RSA RC4(40) MD5
EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 RSA(512) RSA RC2(40) MD5
EXP-RC4-MD5 SSLv2 RSA(512) RSA RC4(40) MD5
NULL-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA None SHA1
NULL-MD5 SSLv3 RSA RSA None MD5
ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 DH None 3DES(168) SHA1
ADH-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 DH None DES(56) SHA1
ADH-RC4-MD5 SSLv3 DH None RC4(128) MD5
EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-
SHA
SSLv3 DH RSA 3DES(168) SHA1
EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-
SHA
SSLv3 DH DSS 3DES(168) SHA1
EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-
SHA
SSLv3 DH RSA DES(56) SHA1
EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-
SHA
SSLv3 DH DSS DES(56) SHA1
EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-
CBC-SHA
SSLv3 DH(512) RSA DES(40) SHA1
EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-
CBC-SHA
SSLv3 DH(512) DSS DES(40) SHA1
EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-
SHA
SSLv3 DH(512) None DES(40) SHA1
EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5 SSLv3 DH(512) None RC4(40) MD5
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